James A. Carpenter

(This book was given me
by:
Sir Walter Moberly,
Oxford,
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REASON AND RELIGION

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

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Reason and Religion

SOME ASPECTS OF
THEIR MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE

BY

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PREFACE

THE *raison d'être* of this small volume is to be found in the first of the papers which it contains. This paper is of the nature of a protest against much of the thought and language to which we are every day accustomed on the subject of Reason, and is an attempt to give some expression to a different view of what Reason does, and ought to, mean.

I shall hardly be suspected of professing to speak on this subject as an expert. But however little I may be able to use the technical language of philosophy, I must none the less think such a protest as this to be needful; and I believe that, in protesting, I have something to say—even if that something should be effectual rather in

the form into which others correct it, than in that in which it presents itself here.

And, no doubt, these pages are fragmentary. Reason is thought of, in them, only as it were from below. There is no attempt to approach the view of it as from above; to argue that it is what it is, primarily, as an attribute of universal, or Divine, Being. The question is not raised what Reason is beforehand in the nature of things, or in God—before, or apart from, its partial realization in finite personalities. It is certainly, however, not from any want of recognition that the highest realization of Reason in finite personalities is a partial and limited realization of what it really is, that I have here spoken of it only from the point of view of our experience of it in finite personalities. But it is an advantage not to have had to begin by asking, in abstract form, what is that essential nature of Reason itself, which makes it Reason alike—as, on the one hand, in

man, in nature, and in God ; so also, on the other, in its different manifestations within human consciousness,—in the intellect, in the moral character, in the immortal spirit.

I hope that it will not seem to any one irreverent or unspiritual, to have tried to vindicate the essentially rational character of the things which belong distinctively to religious faith ; and therefore to protest against modes of speech or thought which seem irrationally to banish Reason from the deepest experiences and insights of which man is capable.

On the other hand, is it unreasonable to suggest that the great principle which stands revealed in Christianity for ever, the principle of the consecration of life in death ; and the vivification, through death, of life that has died ; the principle, "I die to live, and live just because I died," must have an application to man in respect of the perfecting as well of his intellect as of his character? He

who pursues joy by what seems the direct road, misses it. But he who follows duty, finds joy. Why? Not that joy was an unworthy object of desire; but because, at a certain point, what seemed its surrender was its realization. The challenge to self-surrender seemed from the outside beforehand, like the complete stultifying—nay, destroying—of the very inmost necessities of the self. But it was found to be the surrender only of the lower, as a step to the higher, and the happier, self-realization. Is it not so that Reason also (as she appears in man) seems at a certain point to be challenged to bow her head, and surrender the confident supremacy which had seemed like a right inherent in her being; and that the Reason which so bows her pride is the Reason which arises from submission, not discredited, not derationalized, but crowned with new possibilities of insight into that truth, which is as truly of rational, as it is

not of exclusively rational, character? To me, at least, it appears that the transfiguring of human Reason, which (not because it was Reason, but because it was imperfect and disordered Reason) has surrendered itself in total allegiance to the all-consummating sovereignty of the Spirit of the Incarnate, is like a falling away of scales from the eyes, a bursting of the shackles which held Reason in the imprisonment of an artificial limitation, a great flooding in of illuminating light.

In close connection with this paper I have added also (1) the larger part of a sermon preached as an introduction to some lectures of the Manchester Christian Evidence Society, and (2) a sermon preached before the University of Oxford. The first of these two is earlier than the paper which it here follows, and which is, in some measure, foreshadowed in it. Yet I have ventured to print it, as well as the University sermon, because both, in their different ways, appeared to add

something to the completeness of the thought as expressed in the paper itself.

It is in obedience to the wish of some kind friends, who were generous enough to look through the proofs, and suggest a few alterations and corrections, that I have further added to these a paper which was read at the Church Congress at Rhyl in the autumn of 1891. It is not precisely upon the subject of the former three, but is in some points, at least (as I hope) sufficiently cognate and illustrative.

The same kind friends thought it possible that the result of these few papers, as a whole, might appear to some to be too indefinite and abstract, and, in order to bring them to a more concrete and definite conclusion, would have been glad to see incorporated with them also an essay which I contributed to "Lux Mundi" in 1889, under the title, "The Incarnation as the Basis of Dogma." Against this, as a practical course, there were

many objections. Yet I defer to their mind so far as to mention the matter here. And if there should, in fact, be any one who should read these present pages, and feel inclined to ask at the end, "What then? What is the writer's real drift? What is the definite concreteness of religious doctrine to which all this argument would lead?" I take leave to present him, so far, with their suggestion. He may see in that essay, if he cares to see, in what sort of direction I should myself make answer to his question.

Sir Robt. Moberly who, after Sir Father's death, was sometimes included in the Longworth meetings, Tho' me that young Gentleman often came to Longworth in stead of their coming. Many of them were disposed to Hock Ch. ons and some not supposing it consumed wine & the passing of long & other notes of their particular agrees and wants. Thus the first round of Hock passed in the rear. The Glass of Lemon & Sympathetic & the Sorrow of Sympathetic Hock and the Life of Society in Common Sense with Love which was much of the Sympathetic Sorrow & even more pressed on Hock & the round to round Lemon Sympathetic and How the Common Sense and Sense Sorrow of Hock round, even to the Common Thus Hocks of round Hypochondriacs.

RATIONAL OR NON-RATIONAL?

IT is curiously difficult to define the very ideas which are most fundamental and necessary to our thought. We have reasoned for centuries; and yet, at the end, it seems that we are strangely perplexed to know what we mean by Reason. Is Reason to be contrasted with authority, or is authority rational? Is Reason to be contrasted with faith, or what is the nature of the Apostolic desire that every Christian should be ready to give a reason of the hope that is in him? Can man be defined as a rational animal? is "moral" included in, or outside of, "rational"? or what is the relation between the reason and the will? and what is the place of Reason in the *spiritual* life? Unfortunately, it is impossible to hand over such questions

as these to psychological, or other, experts. Whether explicitly or not, the whole world practically asks and practically answers them. And the answers which are given, however implicitly, determine much of the character of everyday practical life.

Perhaps at all times the minds of men have been perplexed by such topics as these. But that they are so in our day to no common degree, no ordinary observer can doubt.

It was only the year before last that the world was reading with no small interest a very attractive book by Mr. Kidd. Probably, even to the reading world, the audacity of his conception of Reason was somewhat staggering. For he at least was clear, and without a qualm in his clearness, that Reason lay outside of morality and religion altogether. "There can never be, it would appear, such a thing as a rational religion. The essential element in all religious beliefs must apparently be the *ultra*-rational sanction which they provide for social

conduct." "A rational religion is a scientific impossibility, representing from the nature of the case an inherent contradiction of terms." "A religion is a form of belief, providing an ultra-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing. We have here the principle at the base of all religions." "The essential element in a religion is that its doctrines should be inaccessible to reason." "All [religious beliefs] assert uncompromisingly . . . that right and wrong are right and wrong by divine or supernatural enactment, outside of and independent of any other cause whatever."

I am not the least concerned now to criticize these statements (most of which are not statements incidentally thrown out, but conclusions formally reached and enunciated

in italics), or to distinguish in them the kernel of truth which they have so extraordinarily perverted. The picture as it stands is sufficiently grotesque: Reason, as a sort of more-than-animal cleverness of purely selfish animal cunning; social morality, the demand upon individuals to sacrifice themselves and their reason for the sake of the community; and religion as a sort of non-rational bogey policeman coming in to enforce the non-rational demand of society.

But the book was very widely read; and must be supposed, in some measure at least, both to have represented existing thought, and to have contributed towards the formation of thought.

Not many months afterwards the public mind was much occupied with a book, of very different character, by no less a person than the present First Lord of the Treasury. Now, whatever Mr. Balfour understands by Reason, it can hardly be contended that his book, as it stands, is calculated to remove

any previously existing confusion as to the meaning of the word. There are many, sufficiently striking, indications[1] that the sense in which he freely uses the word in his argument is not the sense in which he understands it himself. But he has not made this unmistakably clear; and he has certainly not given any adequate exposition either of what he himself understands to be the truth of the word, or of the exact amount of truth, or of uncertainty, or of falsehood, which he considers to belong to that sense in which he generally uses the word throughout the book. The argument of the chapter about "Authority and Reason," which has attracted, perhaps, as much attention as any, turns upon the use of the word "Reason" in a sense in which it is antithetical to authority; and this use, however different in many ways from that of Mr. Kidd, is, in respect of the ultimate question as to how far the higher moral

[1] See pp. 72, 75–77, 83–86 (and note on 195), 246, 294, 322, 323, 327.

and spiritual qualities are rational or non-rational, only too nearly akin to it. It is difficult to doubt the general nature of the effect which will be produced by the striking conclusion of the chapter just referred to: "If we are to judge with equity between these rival claimants, we must not forget that it is Authority rather than Reason to which in the main we owe not religion only, but ethics and politics; that it is Authority which supplies us with essential elements in the premises of science; that it is Authority rather than Reason which lays deep the foundations of social life; that it is Authority rather than Reason which cements its superstructure. And though it may seem to savour of paradox, it is yet no exaggeration to say, that if we could find the quality in which we most notably excel the brute creation, we should look for it not so much in our faculty of convincing and being convinced by the exercise of reasoning, as in our capacity for

influencing and being influenced through the action of Authority." When the word "Reason" is freely used in this way, and this is called the "ordinary and popular," and assumed to be a possible, use, and yet the truth or falsehood of the use is not examined, far less defined, it can hardly be matter of surprise if the general effect of the book is not to remove, perhaps even to intensify, the pre-existing confusion of popular thought as to what is, and what is not, meant by Reason.

Almost simultaneously with the publication of "The Foundations of Belief," came that of Mr. Romanes' "Thoughts on Religion," a book which also, from very obvious causes, attracted wide attention. In the course of a striking autobiographical passage as to the nature of faith, and the challenge which it makes to man, Mr. Romanes writes,[1] "There are agnostics who

[1] § 4 of the "Notes," p. 132. The italics are mine.

would greatly prefer being theists, and theists who would give all they possess to be Christians, if they could thus secure promotion by purchase—*i.e.* by one single act of *will*. But yet the desire is not strong enough to sustain the will in perpetual action, so as to make the sacrifices which Christianity entails. *Perhaps the hardest of these sacrifices to an intelligent man is that of his own intellect.*" Of Mr. Romanes and his book I can speak only with profound respect. Moreover, I perfectly recognize that even the words just italicized have, in respect of himself and his own life's experience, a very real and true meaning. But even this recognition of their relative and personal truth, and still more the very greatness of the reverence which I must always feel for the writer of them, make me feel it to be not only right, but necessary, to demur to the form into which they are thrown. That which may have a meaning, as a partial and

relative truth, is stated as a principle of truth, quite absolutely and without reserve. Whatever sympathy we may have with the condition of things in reference to which such an expression might, in a sense, be right, we cannot allow for a moment that it is broadly true that Christianity entails the "sacrifice of the intellect." I am quite aware that some, at least, of the qualification necessary to make such a phrase admissible is supplied by Mr. Romanes himself; but I doubt whether such qualifications will make as much impression on the generality of readers as the unqualified statement which I have quoted, and against which I think it is due, not less to himself than to the truth, to put in some word of protest.

For the present I merely point to these three writings—widely different as they are, yet all alike both recent and conspicuous—as furnishing justification for any attempt to make common thought clearer in respect

of the meaning and use of such words as "Reason" and "Rational."

Perhaps the root-cause of the ambiguity is not far to seek. It lies in this, that the term "man" is at once a simple and a complex term. We call man an "individual," and by analysis forthwith we divide and subdivide him. His reason is a part of the man, quite distinguishable from his character. His reason is an aspect of the whole man; it is, therefore, inherent in the character, and the character in it. These are inconsistent modes of statement. But we do not, and we shall not, get rid of either of them.

But if we cannot eliminate the ambiguity, we may perhaps so make it clear as to cease to be either perplexed or misled by it. In order to this, it is necessary to begin with analysis.

Take first the familiar subdivisions of the New Testament. Man is divided sometimes into body and soul, in which case soul includes

all that is not body; and sometimes soul (ψυχή) is subdivided into ψυχή and πνεῦμα. Then man is threefold—body, soul, and spirit; and the "soul" is contrasted with the "spirit," as the low and vile with the lofty and transcendent. Now, this threefold division is a familiar, and in a certain sense may be called an authoritative, one. But observe how elusive it is. The obvious fact that in the New Testament itself the word ψυχή is ambiguous,[1]—sometimes including (and, if including, then being characterized by) πνεῦμα, sometimes set in sharp antithesis against it,—is a strong hint that the distinction is not, after all, so definite as it seems; and, indeed, as between the ψυχή and the πνεῦμα, however different may be the general direction of the ideas suggested by the two words, it has always been impossible to draw a dividing line. And the

[1] Examine the implications of Matt. vi. 25, x. 28, and xvi. 25, 26; and compare with 1 Thess. v. 23, Heb. iv. 12, and *every* New Testament instance of the adjective ψυχικός, viz. 1 Cor. ii. 14, xv. 44, 46; Jas. iii. 15; Jude 19.

more we think of it, the less real does the division, as division, become. There is a wide difference of quality. There is no distinction of parts. I do not, nor does any man, consist partly of a conscious livingness, and partly of a spiritual capacity. From the moment that I am once for all touched with πνεῦμα, my whole conscious livingness has become, for good or for evil, of spiritual quality. To him who is once for all in capacity spiritualized, there is no longer anything which is *not* spiritual. All his thought, and reflection, and aim, even his eating and drinking, his lying down and his rising up, seeing that they can now be expressions of a spiritual nature, acquire a character as spiritual. If I eat and drink, think and aim, *wrongly*, I do wrong in the spiritual as well as in the natural life. I cannot any longer dissociate my ψυχὴ from its character as πνευματικὴ. I can, of course, transgress against my "spiritual" possibilities; I can live ψυχικῶς, and so, on

the whole, be summed up and described as ψυχικός. But this will not mean—good were it for me if it could mean—that I was literally or absolutely not πνευματικὸς. On the contrary, the very heinousness of the guilt which I incur depends on the truth that, *being* πνευματικὸς, I nevertheless lived ψυχικῶς. There is, in fact, no human ψυχὴ which is not once for all, for good or for evil, more or less explicitly a πνευματικὴ ψυχὴ. For ψυχὴ which is wholly not πνευματικὴ you must look elsewhere than in humanity. And conversely there is, internal to human life, no πνεῦμα which is distinct from the ψυχὴ; which does not characterize the ψυχὴ, and find its own expression in terms of ψυχὴ; which is not, in a word, ψυχὴ πνευματικὴ.[1] It

[1] It may be well, perhaps, to guard against some misconception by saying that the thought of the mode of the indwelling Spirit of God is not immediately in question. Of "Spirit," no doubt, there are infinite degrees. All life, I presume, even vegetable life, is (so far as it goes) from the breath of God alone. There is no other, alternative, source of life. But if so, much more animal life. Much more rational

is then a division, and yet not a division. It is all both ψυχικὴ and πνευματικὴ. As he who is ἐν πνεύματι can live ψυχικῶς and be summed up as ψυχικὸς, so he who is a ψυχὴ can live

life. Much more rational life that has become, once for all, of spiritualized capacity (Gen. ii. 7). Much more the life, amongst men, of God's chosen—the patriarchs, the children of Israel. Much more, amongst Israelites, those who represent the concentration of the inspiration of Israel—prophets and psalmists, as Moses, Joshua, David, Elijah, Isaiah, and others. Of all these our Lord's solemn statement makes John Baptist a climax (Matt. xi. 11); but only, in the same breath, to depreciate his climax of privilege by contrast with that of the least in a dispensation which utterly transcended all before it. Indeed, all that had gone before is summed up in the New Testament as darkness (Matt. iv. 16), death (2 Cor. iii. 7), condemnation (2 Cor. iii. 9), the negation of Spirit (cp. John vii. 39 with Acts ii. 1–21, viii. 15–17, etc.); not absolutely, indeed, but by contrast—a contrast of degree amounting to an absolute antithesis, as 2 Cor. iii. 9, 10 explains. Into all this, however, the argument in the text is not entering. But even of the climax of all this I presume that it is not untrue to say—whatever further mystery may attach to the thought of "indwelling"—that in proportion as the Divine πνεῦμα becomes properly internal to human life, He does so not as remaining distinct from, but as really characterizing, the spiritually capacitated ψυχὴ; so that the ψυχὴ of the man is, in sense more and more transcendent, a divinely Πνευματικὴ ψυχὴ.

πνευματικῶς and be accepted as πνευματικὸς. Yet in strict speech—amongst men, at least—neither has any existence that is not both.

And if this is the case between ψυχὴ and πνεῦμα, it will be felt, perhaps, that even the distinction of σῶμα, which seems at first sight quite final and absolute, is not, after all, in the life of one who is by hypothesis a πνευματικὸ ψυχό, so absolute as it seems. The body, which is the avenue of the expression of a ψυχὸ πνευματικὴ, itself acquires the character of that which it expresses. As he who is "rational" eats and drinks with conscious purpose (which an animal, if it is really irrational, does not); so he who is spiritual, acts spiritually as well as consciously even in the simplest and lowliest of bodily acts. If he does them wrongly, he is spiritually as well as materially wrong; if he does them devoutly, they are spiritual as well as natural or physical acts of obedience. It is only through the avenue of the bodily life

that the spirit can act spiritually; nor is any act of the bodily life really outside of the reach and domain of the spiritual. But I do not now enlarge upon this.

I pass for the moment from this scriptural analysis, to another which is hardly less familiar. We are accustomed to a threefold division of the conscious life. We distinguish in it three strands—the intellectual, the moral, and the spiritual. We distinguish the rational intelligence from the moral conscience. We distinguish the present conscience of right and wrong, as such, from the belief in, and the craving for, or the inner sense of, eternal affinities, which transcend present consciousness and life. Obviously these three strands are distinguishable, for we cannot even help distinguishing them. Yet they are strands in a single consciousness; and it is as fundamentally impossible to separate them as it is to abstain from thinking of them as distinguishable. Moreover, in this case, as in the

former, the distinguishableness is of aspects rather than of parts; and of aspects which, even as aspects, presuppose and imply one another. Thought may for certain purposes abstract rational intelligence from moral character. But, in fact, there is no such thing in human experience as rational intelligence by itself; rational intelligence that is not the intelligence of a moral person; that has not, therefore, inseparably from its rational existence and activity, a moral character. Neither can there exist any moral which has not also a rational aspect and character. There is no such thing as a non-moral rational. There is no such thing as a non-rational moral. Either without the other is a mere, and a practically impossible, abstraction. Dumb animals simulate both the moral and the rational. How far they really attain to either we know not. But even of a dumb animal it seems natural to imagine that just so far as it really has rational, it must also have

moral capacity; so far as it is moral it must, *ipso facto*, be conceived of as rational also. Of course, for this purpose, immoral is included in moral. I cannot be immoral, except as a result of having moral character and capacity. Immoral or moral, they are but divers forms of moral characterization; they are alike completely antithetical to non-moral. The distinction, then, between rational and moral is an abstraction, which can never by any possibility be realized in truth. The reason, which is the reason of a moral agent, can never be wholly apart from moral (or immoral) quality of character. As for the existence of moral character which should be wholly apart from rational intelligence, it is an impossibility, not only in concrete experience, but in abstract thought. It is not only non-existent, but unthinkable. Morality, if strictly non-rational, could not be moral; non-rational morality is a contradiction in terms.

The same thing is no less obviously true

when we compare the moral and the spiritual. So completely do these (within the experience of human personalities) interpenetrate, and in practice presuppose one another, that it is matter of some effort to define either so as even to seem to exclude the other from view. If we think of the moral conscience, as discerning present distinctions of right and wrong, we are quite aware that to the moral, which is once for all spiritual too, the whole ultimate sanction and meaning of the most present and most ordinary right and wrong is found not so much in the demonstrable, as in the transcendent, affinities and necessities of the personal consciousness. Conversely, if we try to fix our thought on the spiritual only, we find it quickly tending to be evanescent and illusory, unless it appears, in very large measure indeed, as strengthened and glorified morality. Though the word "morality" does not at all correspond to ψυχή, and spiritual, as distinguished from

moral, is not in meaning identical with spiritual as distinguished from psychical, yet what was said just now about the mutual inseparableness of ψυχὴ and πνεῦμα in what is, once for all, a πνευματικὴ ψυχή, will apply no less to the inseparableness of the moral and the spiritual in a personality whose "moral" consciousness is always spiritually informed, and whose "spirituality" cannot but be morally characterized. And, in point of fact, no "personality" is known to us of which these things are not, in principle, true. There is no moral conscience of right and wrong that is not also, implicitly at least, a spiritual, transcending experience and life. There is no spiritual, transcending experience, which does not posit, and in a real sense even exist by, the irreversible distinction of right and wrong. To say that there can be moral which is wholly non-spiritual, would be at least to travel outside experience. To say that there can be spiritual which is wholly

non-moral, would be a direct contradiction and absurdity.

Now, if the moral is coextensive with the rational, and the spiritual is coextensive with the moral, it follows that the spiritual and the rational are coextensive also. And there is in fact, at least within human experience, no such thing as a rational consciousness which is not also spiritual. On the other hand, to conceive of a spiritual consciousness which is not also rational, would be to conceive a monstrosity.

Are things like these said with a view to deny, or attempt to obliterate, the threefold distinction, between the rational (so called) and the moral and the spiritual? On the contrary, the distinctions which are intended herein are ineradicable. To obliterate them, so far from bringing us nearer to the truth, would make at once all three unintelligible and unreal. So far from denying the distinction, I desire rather to emphasize it. Only,

after emphasizing it, I must return to the thought of its limitation, as abstract and unreal, in presence of the personal singleness, which unifies, after all, whatever distinctions the analysis of a personal unity postulates. It is thus, as I conceive, that it is possible to arrive at a consistent conception of Reason and its relation to the moral and the spiritual consciousness—in view of the ineradicable ambiguity by which it is, and must always be, at once distinguishable from them and yet indistinguishable.

Hitherto I have continued to use the word "Reason" with (I hope) sufficient practical intelligibleness. But before going further I must try to be more sure what exactly I mean by it. Of course I do not expect to be able to *define* what runs back so far behind the defining power of words. But what sort of thing do I mean by it? I do not mean difficulty or imperfectness of understanding, or laboriousness of process in getting at what

I understand. I do not mean process, or machinery, or imperfectness, as such, at all. Neither the length, nor the tediousness, nor the mode of the working of the wheels, are the point of what I want. I want something which is to these as the end to the means. If my reasoning in fact is tedious or incomplete—this is Reason's failure, not the very thing meant by Reason. I want, as Reason itself, something behind the mere clumsiness of its process; something truer, subtler, freer; something which (apart from its imperfectnesses) is more immediate, more positive, more illumining. The nearest account that I can give of what I want, may first perhaps be given in a twofold form. By Reason, then, I seem to myself to mean (1) a conscious recognition of *truth* as *true;* and (2) a consciously progressive advance from perception of truth to consequential perception of further truth. The first may roughly be called understanding or insight; the second

may be roughly called inference. I have divided them, for the moment, as two; but the two are not really so distinct as they seem—perhaps not really distinct at all. For, since insight is never really devoid of data, it partakes more or less of the character of "inference;" and I must emphatically decline to have "inference" measured or defined by its laboriousness, its limitation, or its failure. The more immediate it is—the more intuitive and instinct-like in its processes—so much is it the perfecter. Though, then, it was convenient to mention them first as two, they may both, on reflection, be described as the insight of a personally conscious understanding. Of course this is only a description. Nothing more is possible. And, of course, it depends for its intelligibleness on the fact that it is addressed to those who already have Reason, and are personally conscious of it themselves before they hear it described. It is obvious that Reason cannot be

explained, any more than it can be defined. But to me the description seems fairly to include and characterize all that can be called Rational, from the simplest 1 and 1 make 2, up to the highest rational intelligence of science or ethics, of metaphysic or theology.

Now, inasmuch as every human personality has, as such, intelligence, character, and a possibility which, while expressing itself in both, transcends and illuminates, demands and accounts for, both; inasmuch as every human personality is simultaneously rational and moral and spiritual: and the spiritual, to be spiritual, must be moral; and the moral, to be moral, must be rational; and the reason, if non-moral, could not be the reason of a person; and the moral, if non-spiritual, could not be the character of such a person as alone is known to us;—it will be necessary to try and make clear the position that it is not only the rational distinctively so called

which is really rational. The moral is rational, and the spiritual is rational no less. If we are to take them, for analytical purposes, apart (though apart, in fact, they never are or can be), we shall have to recognize three distinct kinds of reason—the reason or intelligence of the intellectual faculty, the reason or intelligence of the moral character, and the reason or intelligence of the spiritual consciousness. The *word* "Reason," being borrowed from the first and most obvious of the three, is used (and cannot but be used) of it distinctively. Yet the apparent implication in this distinctive use, viz. that the moral or the spiritual faculties are in any wise less rational than the "rational" (so called), would be directly false. It is borrowed from the first and most obvious application, just in the same way in which words of mental feeling are habitually borrowed from the more obvious feelings of the body. But if

it is thus far borrowed from the merely rational, it is borrowed because such borrowing is an absolute necessity; it is borrowed because precisely that quality of rationality which it expresses in respect of the merely intellectual sphere is also true, and must also be expressed—is true in the same way and must be expressed in the same terms—of the moral or spiritual intelligence also. The intelligence of the moral character is not identical with intelligence merely intellectual; and yet in one thing it is wholly like it, viz. in the fact of being intelligent. The intelligence of the spiritual consciousness is not identical either with the intelligence of the moral character, or with the merely intellectual intelligence; yet is it no less of the essence of it to be rationally intelligent.

There is, then, in the word "Rational" an ambiguity, which is so inherent in the facts, that it cannot by any possibility be eliminated. At one and the same moment Reason

means (and must continue to mean)—the insight and process of the merely intellectual, regarded as, by abstraction, distinctively apart; and the insight and process of the (essentially rational) moral; and the insight and process of the (supremely rational) spiritual.

I must insist that the word "Reason," in these three cases, has really three distinct, and not identical, senses. It is not the case that the first of the three is intellectual reason taken alone; the second, the very same intellectual reason, with moral consciousness added to it; and the third, the same intellectual reason again, with the simple addition of either spiritual capacity, or spiritual and moral capacity combined. It is not certain extraneous additions to, or conditions of, the reason; it is the quality and character of the reason itself, which varies as we proceed from the first case to the other two;—save only in this, that its more complex and subtler varieties do not differ, in *being less*

rational, from the first. The reason of a merely rational intelligence, if it existed (which it does not), or so far as our imagination can approach towards it, would not be identical, as reason, with the reason of a moral conscience. We can imagine questions, of calculation or measurement, in respect of which the rational intellect would be, by comparison, so nearly isolated from the whole personal character, that a man of Mephistophelian intellect, or a perfectly calculating machine, would be a far finer instrument for the solution of them than the ablest and best human person of the ordinary sort. Questions, perhaps, about the path of cannon-balls, or the bursting of shells, to be inferred by the minutest study and comparisons of marks left with varying degrees of plainness upon various sorts of materials by splinters that separated and glanced at unexpected angles, —such as these might perhaps be capable of settlement only through most complicated and

ingenious marshalling of calculations, into which personal character would enter so little, that the most desperately wicked genius, or (what is more to the purpose) genius to which right and wrong were literally meaningless, would be, beyond all comparison, far abler to deal with them than the most upright of average men.

But pass into what is essentially a moral problem. There has been, suppose, dishonesty in a boys' or girls' school. There are difficult questions of evidence, as to facts, and the interpretation of facts, and the interpretation of character, to unravel. You need ready wit, and keenness of intellectual discernment. Intellect is as emphatically necessary here as it was in the former case. But intellect, however keen, which is intellect only, intellect which is not the *intellect of a moral consciousness*, will not disentangle aright—will not even understand—the most crucial parts of the evidence. Parts of the evidence there may be which it

will discern perfectly. But the most determining evidence of all will be in a region to which it has no access, in a subject-matter of which it has no knowledge, and upon which (so to speak) its utmost keenness of edge cannot bite at all. Why was A close to the scene of the theft at that moment? Why was the money found in B's pocket? Why did this child blush, or tremble, or hesitate? Why was that one pale? or another so voluble and self-possessed? Every one of these things may have been the direct result of innocence or the direct proof of guilt. What is the moral value of a blush or a tremor, a hesitancy or a readiness to explain? The keenest intellect of the mere reason could not measure or answer at all. Observe, moreover, that keen intellect, having moral character side by side with it, yet separate from it (if that were possible, which it is not), would not suffice. You want not keen insight *plus* moral experience, but a moral experience which is

keenly intelligent—the *keen insight of a moral experience.* The moral consciousness must be within the intelligence. The intelligence must be the intelligence of moral character. The quality of the necessary subject is changed. It is not mere intellect, but moral consciousness, which must be keen-sighted; and with the change (so to express it) of the subject which is keen-sighted, the quality of that which is meant by "keen-sightedness" has in part changed too.

This truth is largely disguised for us by the very fact that the intellectual and the moral never are, nor can be, in fact, separated in any form of consciousness known to us. We speak of what the intellectual man does, or perhaps of what "intellect" does, forgetting that no instance is known to us of intellect which is not the intellect of a person who can be morally characterized—which is not, therefore, inseparably moral. When it is said, therefore, that mere intellect could not bite

upon the moral subject-matter, we must not think of the case of an intellectual man whom we think (comparatively) non-moral; for no man, in fact, is non-moral, and therefore no man is wholly disqualified to interpret moral consciousness or its evidence. Even amongst men we may see, perhaps, a greater or less approximation towards such incapacity. But it could only be absolute in the case of an intelligence that was not personal at all—the intelligence, for example, of a calculating machine.

I repeat, then, that the reason of a moral conscience is not, even as reason, identical with the reason of a "merely rational" intellect. Indeed, the very meaning and purpose of the phrase "merely rational intellect" is (however impossibly in fact) to exclude, *ex hypothesi*, the moral and the spiritual consciousness. It is only for such distinctiveness that the phrase is employed. But reason which is a quality of morals cannot be identical with reason from

which morals are excluded *ex hypothesi*. This reason is an intensely moral quality. It is one of the highest achievements of moral being. It is—in one direction—a sort of consummation and triumph of moral experience. We recognize it both as illuminative insight, and as illuminative advance, or inference, from insight to insight. It is reason every whit as much as is reason of the mere intellect. Nay, in relation to the discernment of eternal and ultimate truth, I shall claim that it is a higher perfectness of reason. The reason of the more complex and perfect subject is not less reason, but more, than the reason of the merely intellectual intellect. Abstract intellect does not, indeed, exist. If it did, I should claim that moral intellect was at bottom not only more moral, but more intellectual—nearer to comprehensive insight of eternal truth—than it.

Again, apply the same sort of thought to the reason of the spiritual consciousness also. In relation to man's spiritual being, as

transcendent, as eternal, there are problems and inferences, revelations, and convictions, and experiences. Submit them to the reason of the mere intellect (as abstracted, or supposed to be abstracted, from what is moral and spiritual), and it cannot pronounce, cannot get real grip or hold of them at all. Why? —because it is too reasonable? No; but because it is, as reason, too imperfectly equipped. It is competent only for certain lower forms or exercises of reason. If its keenness of edge could not bite upon problems of moral experience, still less can it bite upon the distinctively spiritual. Even the reason of a moral consciousness, if it were moral only, and wholly non-spiritual (which no moral consciousness can in fact absolutely be, however much some, by atrophy of the spiritual, may seem to approach it), could not get a grip upon this. It is not that spiritual questions would seem too hard to it. They would not seem to be questions, would not seem to have

a meaning at all. Probably it would call them emptiness or foolishness, as moral problems would be called by a machine that was merely intellectual. An intellect which could perfectly grapple with many mathematical or logical arguments might fail wholly to measure or comprehend the moral conscience. Even the intellect of the moral conscience, until, under the forms of good and evil, it began to understand life in ways and by means which transcended any merely moral experience—and, in transcending, for the first time really illuminated it—would fall back at a loss before the whole region of thought and experience which is for us represented by such words as Contrition, or Atonement, or Holiness, or Divine Love, or Regeneration, or Absolution, or the sacramental feeding on the Body and Blood of Christ, or the indwelling Presence of the Holy Ghost. It is as vain to measure such realities as these by the instruments of the merely intellectual intellect, as it would be to

try and analyze the truth of them by the help of the laboratory or the microscope. For their purposes microscope and laboratory may be admirable, but they are ludicrously irrelevant to the matter in hand. And so what I have called the merely intellectual intellect is simply unable so much as to touch the problems or experiences of the spiritual life. Why?—because these problems or experiences lie outside of reason? No. They are rational through and through. They are nothing, if they are not rational. But because the Reason which alone can understand and fruitfully reason upon them is not the reason of a merely rational instrument or animal, not even the reason (if that were all) of a moral consciousness, but the Reason of a rationally and morally self-conscious spiritual personality.

Much as in the last case I may repeat again here, that one reason why this contrast is not more apparent even than it is, is because no man's reason, however merely

intellectual he either conceives it, or intends it, to be, is ever wholly without the moral and the spiritual capability. He who would most reduce ethics to the plane of mechanical science cannot quite eclipse or ignore his moral instincts. He who least concedes intellectually the sphere of spirit, has it at least so far potentially within him that he makes some—perhaps much—unconscious room for it, and use of it, in his thought; at the least he acts spiritually, and does spiritual wrong, even in disavowing and contemning spirit.

Now, for several pages past, I have been chiefly engaged in emphasizing the distinctness of these three forms or qualities of Reason. Having done so, I must return again to insist upon their absolute inseparableness within the real indivisible personal unity. Though certainly not in meaning identical, though for clearness of conception necessarily to be distinguished, they are never really distinct; for no one of them

exists apart, or is capable of being really a subject. My rational intellect, my moral character, my spiritual consciousness,—it is an error, after all, to make subjects of these. Only I, who am simultaneously all these, am a subject really. There are not really, as I have been compelled to call them, the intelligence of the intellect, and the intelligence of the character, and the intelligence of the spirit; but my intelligence as I am rational, my intelligence as I am moral (or immoral), my intelligence as I am (for good or for evil) spiritual. Or, again, to make it clearer still that I only am the subject throughout, it is I who am intellectual, I who am moral, I who am spiritual; and the I, who am spiritual and therefore moral, who am moral and therefore intellectual, am throughout, and in all, the same indivisible I. No doubt it is true that by thinking and acting habitually as if some one of these three were the only, or the only valuable,

form of intelligence and insight,—by so magnifying the merely intellectual as to ignore the moral, or the moral as if it had no spiritual significance, I may sacrifice the due harmony and completeness of myself, I may be quite disproportionately identified with the lower which I pursue, and may incur by disuse a more or less complete atrophy and paralysis of some higher side of my nature. If so, I may correctly enough, in ordinary language, be summed up and characterized as merely intellectual, or moral (just as the man who lived ψυχικῶς might be called simply ψυχικὸς, or he who lived πνευματικῶς might be called simply πνευματικὸς,—never being, in fact, simply either, but remaining in nature a ψυχὴ πνευματικὴ throughout); but however much I may tend towards identification with the merely intellectually, or perhaps with the intellectually and the morally—to the atrophy of the spiritually—intelligent, it is not within human possibilities to be

literally or absolutely divested of any one of the inherent capacities which, since God "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul," have been in fact among the essential constituents of the self-conscious personality of man.

Man's experienced nature is *de facto* ambiguous. If "single," it is certainly not "simple." He is animal, is "rational," is moral, is spiritual. The animal, the rational (distinctively so called), the moral, the spiritual, are not only distinguishable, but are, up to a certain point, capable even of contrast and collision. Yet the collision is not absolute; nor is it, strictly speaking, between these, which are but aspects or qualities of himself, in thought only abstracted from each other: it is he, as animal, or as rational, as moral or as spiritual, who is in antithesis and discord within himself.

It is not, of course, claimed that the threefold division given above is a final or exact

division. Man may be divided perhaps into two, certainly into three, or four, perhaps into more, "aspects" or "parts." But, to speak still of the threefold division which most nearly concerns our argument, it is to be observed that while man is rational (so called), and moral and spiritual, he can hardly be said to be all these precisely equally. The moral includes the rational, and the spiritual includes the moral. I have already urged this in relation to the truth that the moral and the spiritual are (to say the least) not less rational than the rational. But observe also that as you rise in thought from stage to stage, the more complex the stage, the more nearly does it comprehend and represent the whole man. Man is body and is mind. He may be said to be unreservedly both, yet man is more characteristically mind than body. Again, he is intellectual and is moral. Yet it is more characteristic of him, it is more nearly the whole truth about him, to say that

he is a moral being, than to say that he is simply an intellectual animal. Once more, he is moral and is spiritual. But his spiritual aspect and character is more totally and vitally himself, than his moral consciousness could be if taken apart from its spiritual meaning and sanction. As the chemical includes and transcends the mechanical, and the animal the vegetable, and the rational the animal, so each higher stage in the complex consciousness of man absorbs and transcends the lower, and characterizes, more perfectly, the very man himself.

Yet the parallel is not complete throughout. For however much it may be true that animate life has supervened upon conditions chemical and material, so that, in a sense, the material may be said to be animated, or the animate life may be said to be material; yet it can hardly be contended that a non-material animate is *per se* contradictory or unthinkable in the sense in which a non-

rational moral would be. Rationality is a necessarily inherent ingredient in the moral and the spiritual, so that non-rational moral could not be moral, and non-rational spiritual could not be spiritual at all. But if materiality can in fact be predicated of all known animate and moral life, the fact that it is so is rather of the nature of a perpetual paradox than of a necessary postulate of thought. To be rational and yet seem non-moral, or moral without spiritual sign, may be easy; but to think of the spirituality of what is non-moral, or the morality of what is not rational, could only imply a grievous caricature of the moral and spiritual idea.

As, then, man is a person of manifold being; and his reason, his character, his spiritual insight, are alike rational; the word "reason" is a word from which ambiguity cannot be eliminated. I have used freely such phrases as "merely rational" or "rational so called." It is, no doubt, to this "merely

rational,"—which is a mental abstraction, omitting *ex hypothesi* the moral and the spiritual,—that the *word* "reason" primarily belongs; and from this that it is extended to the other two. It is, therefore, quite useless to attempt to disallow or deny the use of the words "reason" and "rational" in this narrow and distinctive sense.

This being so, the attempt is often, and not unnaturally, made to restrict the word "reason" absolutely to this narrow sense, and at least for purposes of specific argument, to define and use it as if it meant no more. Unfortunately, the attempt is a wholly impossible one. With the best intentions, no one does, or will, succeed for many minutes together, for the purposes of any argument whatever, in completely shutting up the word "rational" to the merely, as opposed to the morally, rational.

I hope I have indicated sufficiently that the reason why the attempt is impossible,

is because it would be fundamentally irrational and untrue. So inveterately is the moral judgment felt to be rational, that the attempt, however genuinely made, to make it verbally non-rational, cannot but end in shipwreck. Or, if any one could consistently think out an argument on this verbal hypothesis, his argument and its conclusions would be so grotesquely out of relation to practical truth, that they could only entangle—not elucidate — thought. Try as you will, you cannot get rid of the postulate of thought — which will peep out in language — that moral goodness is reasonable. Mr. Kidd tried hard, and succeeded only in throwing what was otherwise a most suggestive book into the wildest confusion. Mr. Balfour has seemed to give, in effect, only too much countenance to the same impossible attempt.

There is, in fact, nothing for it but to recognize frankly that "reason" must, in the nature of things, continue to be used in

two diverse senses. That which is abstracted from the moral and the spiritual must be still the "merely" or "distinctly" rational; but yet, at the very same time, the moral and the spiritual must be recognized as unreservedly, and even more importantly, rational than the "rational."

If "rational" could be used in the narrower sense only, then the whole sphere of the moral and the spiritual ought to be rigidly and absolutely non-rational. But this language, though attempts have been made to use it, involves the most absurd falsification of all human consciousness. On the other hand, no recognition that spiritual insight was the truest and perfectest reason would ever enable us not to think and to speak of processes of mere intellect — the first rudiments, for instance, of arithmetic — as other than distinctively rational.

Now here, perhaps, I might not incon-

sistently bring the immediate argument to a close. But it seems to me that both the truth and the importance of the present contention would be emphasized by a little further dwelling upon some of the consequences which habitually follow upon its neglect. It is not only here and there that confusion is introduced into the thought of a few more or less philosophical writers. The same confusion, if less sharply expressed, is not less familiar, in vast regions of popular thought, and on many sides. It is, for instance, most characteristic of material experience and scientific thought, just so far as this makes—as it often does make—an antithesis between the rational and the spiritual faculties, exalting the so-called rational insight and inferences, as constituting the sum of really rational knowledge, and depreciating every insight or inference of spiritual experience, as lying outside the limits of knowledge and reason. The same

antithesis is no less habitually made from the side of religion, by all those who with unbalanced and exaggerated emphasis think, or speak, or preach, of depreciating the intellectual for the sake of the spiritual, of sacrificing reason to faith. I do not mean that there is not a limited sense in which such phrases may express a truth that will be relatively true to individual characters; but certainly in this broad form, unqualified as they often are and unrelated, it is untruth, even more than truth, that the words themselves express.

It seems to be too often forgotten, on the side of morality and religion, that if there is a sense in which "character" is more vital than "belief," there is a deeper sense still in which reality of conviction creates the character. What I really am in act is the outcome of what I really am in mind. Sincerity of conviction gives irresistible force to the practical life. Give me effective

control over the inner thoughts and persuasions of any community, and I will readily answer for their outward conduct. Ideas spread sometimes like wildfire in a community. Even if they be baseless and untrue, they are often of tremendous material power. And convictions are not robbed of their power—if they be but sincere—because they truly accord with eternal realities. For good, or for evil, the real forces of the world are dominated altogether by ideas.

Again, it seems too often to be forgotten that the New Testament conception, both of the consummation of the saints in heaven and of their perfecting towards saintliness now, is no less emphatically expressed in terms of intelligence than in terms of either goodness or joy. To see God; to know God; the beatific vision of God;—these at least are Christian commonplaces.

It is true, of course, that the Apostles realize—none more clearly than St. Paul—

that spiritual wisdom is not a mere extension of intellectual wisdom. It is different in quality, and is to be pursued and attained by different methods. But if knowledge falsely so called may be an enemy, it is to be fought in the interest, not of agnosticism, but of a truer and deeper kind of knowledge. He quotes, indeed, "I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the prudence of the prudent will I reject;" and proceeds, "Where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the disputer of this world? hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For seeing that in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom knew not God, it was God's good pleasure through the foolishness of the preaching to save them that believe. . . . Because the foolishness of God is wiser than men; and the weakness of God is stronger than men."[1] But the object, even of this depreciation of wisdom—the wisdom "of this

[1] 1 Cor. i. 19–25.

world"—is the attainment of wisdom. "Let no man deceive himself. If any man thinketh that he is wise among you in this world, let him become a fool, that he may become wise.[1] For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. For it is written, He that taketh the wise in their craftiness: and again, The Lord knoweth the reasonings of the wise, that they are vain."[2] But however much St. Paul may depreciate a wisdom merely intellectual, that is unguided by the revelation of the Spirit, will any one venture to say that St. Paul eschews a spiritually informed intellectuality? In the very same argument of which these passages are a portion, and intermediate between the two, he himself insists—"Howbeit we speak wisdom among them that are perfect: yet a wisdom not of this

[1] "That he may become wise." This indicates exactly the sense, and the limit of the sense, in which there may be a meaning, economically and temporarily, in the sacrifice of intellect or reason.

[2] 1 Cor. iii. 18–20.

world . . . but we speak God's wisdom in a mystery. . . . But unto us God revealed them through the Spirit: for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. For who among men knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of the man, which is in him? even so the things of God none knoweth, save the Spirit of God. But we received, not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God; that we might know the things that are freely given to us by God. . . . Now the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: and he cannot know them, because they are spiritually judged. . . . For who hath known the mind of the Lord, that he should instruct Him? But we have the mind of Christ." [1]

For the intellectual character of progressive Christian insight, as wisdom, compare such passages as—"We all, with unveiled face

[1] 1 Cor. ii. 6–16.

reflecting as a mirror the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, even as from the Lord the Spirit."[1] '"Seeing it is God that said, Light shall shine out of darkness, who shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ."[2] "Now we see in a mirror, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I have been known."[3] Or again, "The riches of His grace, which He made to abound toward us in all wisdom and prudence, having made known unto us the mystery of His will."[4] . . . "I cease not to give thanks for you, making mention of you in my prayers; that the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory, may give unto you a spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of Him; having the eyes of your heart enlightened, that ye may know what is the hope of his calling,

[1] 2 Cor. iii. 18. [2] 2 Cor. iv. 6. [3] 1 Cor. xiii. 12. [4] Eph. i. 7–9.

what the riches of the glory."[1] . . . "That Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith; to the end that ye, being rooted and grounded in love, may be strong to apprehend with all the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, that ye may be filled unto all the fulness of God."[2] On the other hand, "The Gentiles walk, in the vanity of their mind, being darkened in their understanding, alienated from the life of God because of the ignorance that is in them, because of the hardening of their heart."[3] . . . "Look therefore carefully how ye walk, not as unwise, but as wise; . . . be ye not foolish, but understand what the will of the Lord is. . . . Be filled with the Spirit; speaking one to another in psalms and hymns and spiritual songs, singing and making melody with your heart to the Lord."[4]

[1] Eph. i. 16–18.
[2] Eph. iii. 17–19.
[3] Eph. iv. 17, 18.
[4] Eph. v. 15–19.

Once more, St. John, to whom "insight" and "character" seem so closely allied as hardly to be distinguished; to whom not to "say the truth" merely, but to "do the truth," is the natural antithesis to "lying,"—speaks with perfect naturalness of goodness as "knowledge." "I have not written unto you because ye know not the truth, but because ye know it, and because no lie is of the truth. Who is the liar but he that denieth that Jesus is the Christ? This is the antichrist, even he that denieth the Father and the Son. Whosoever denieth the Son, the same hath not the Father: he that confesseth the Son hath the Father also." . . . "We know that, if He shall be manifested, we shall be like Him; for we shall see him even as He is." . . . "Hereby know ye the Spirit of God: every spirit which confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God: and every spirit which confesseth not Jesus is not of God . . . by

this we know the spirit of truth, and the spirit of error. . . . Every one that loveth is begotten of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love. . . . Hereby know we that we abide in Him, and He in us, because He hath given us of His Spirit. And we have beheld and bear witness that the Father hath sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world. Whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God, God abideth in him, and he in God. And we know and have believed the love which God hath in us." . . . "We know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we know Him that is true, and we are in Him that is true, even in the Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life."[1]

Now, it seems to me that from these passages certain very clear principles emerge. First, that the life of the spirit is an intel-

[1] 1 John ii. 21–23; iii. 2; iv. 2–6, 7, 13–16; v. 20.

lectual life—a life of seeing and of knowing, of apprehending and of understanding. It is the real intelligence of things; it is the open vision of God. Secondly, that the intelligence of the spiritual insight is in kind not identical with, but distinct from, the intelligence of the merely intellectual insight. Thirdly, that the attempt to reach the insight of the spiritual intellect, by modes and processes of the intellect merely intellectual, is quite futile: on the contrary, however much the two may be mutually illustrative, and, from the point of view of spirit, more than compatible, this point of view of the spirit may have often to be gained by a more or less explicit abandonment of the intellectually intellectual confidence. Fourthly, that the spiritual is unequivocally higher than the merely intellectual; that its truths are more comprehensive and more true—more true absolutely if at any point they should be found to be irreconcilable—in a sense more

true even when they are not; in the sense, that is, in which it would generally be recognized to be more true to say that "God is Love," than to say that "one and one make two." Fifthly, that whatever region of truth may be open to the intellectual capacity that is not spiritually illuminated, it will certainly not be possible for it to explore or explain the ultimate nature or reality of thought, or of truth, or of life, or of personal consciousness or destiny. And sixthly, that the primary condition of that higher insight of the spiritual life, apart from which intellect will beat itself in vain against the impassable barriers which separate it off for ever from the ultimate truth—of things or of God—is an unreserved homage, alike of the mind, the character, and the spirit, to the Master Truth of the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, with all that the truth of Incarnation involves.

It may be well, perhaps, to distinguish explicitly some of the great principles of eternal

reality which are necessarily involved in the great Master Truth of the Incarnation. First, then, the unequivocal, if tremendous, reality that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, come in the flesh, is God. Secondly, and inseparably from this, the revelation of the Threefoldness of eternal relation within Divine Personality, which is the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity. Thirdly—and inseparably again—the dispensation and presence of the Holy Spirit, as the Spirit of the Christ, and, through the Christ, of the Father, within man,—which, in other words, is the Holy Catholic Church. Fourthly, the tremendous fact of the Atonement, with, on the one side, its inherent postulates both as to the fact, and as to the character and gravity, of sin; and, on the other side, its illuminating revelation (interpreting at once, and interpreted by, the history, nature, and possibilities of sacrifice) of the profound import of the successive moments of birth, and ministry, and

crucifixion, and resurrection, and ascension. Other truths there may be, which are contained as corollaries within these; but these, at least, may be spoken of as—from the point of view of Christian revelation—primary and inseparable conditions of the true intellectual insight into Thought, and Truth, and God.

Now, it is partly with reference to what was said a few pages ago as to the inadequacy of the conception of reason reflected too habitually in popular or scientific or religious language; and it is partly with reference to the scriptural conception of the true insight or wisdom, which I have since tried, however imperfectly, to state; that I feel constrained not to leave the subject without some complaint as to the unnatural and injurious divorce, which modern practice encourages and modern thought approves, between the work of metaphysic and of theology. I must submit that they cannot really be sundered without the directest injury to both. The

true metaphysic must be theological; the true theology must be metaphysical. If metaphysic is the science of the truth of thought, and of the postulates which true thinking involves; if the truth of thought cannot be merely, or mainly, concerned with external machineries and processes, but must be the true reflection of the truth of things; how can the scientific theologian be justified who leaves wholly to others such study of the reality of things as mirrored in thought? or how can the metaphysician be excused who neglects the personal conditions of insight into the very truth he desires to explore? Only if there be no such thing as metaphysical truth, can theology ignore it. Only if Christian theology be utterly false, can metaphysical truth dispense with it. Thought, with its postulates, is a revelation of God. It cannot but be in perfect consistency with God's more direct revelation, if there be one, of Himself. If the Incarnation be true, true

metaphysic and true theology can no longer be sundered. It is not nearly so fully recognized as it should be that the great Fathers of Christian theology are hardly, if at all, more truly the predecessors of those whom we distinctively call theologians, than they are of the great masters of abstract thought. The determined severance of the two is a serious damage to both. He to whom metaphysic is nonsensical or unimportant cannot have any high rank as theologian. Theology which cannot interpret to its generation the light of Divine revelation on the postulates and character of thought, or which has even to cling to its theological dogmas in despite of admitted principles and requirements of thought, is at once theology narrowed, departmental, inadequate, and is too often presently felt to be, in greater degree or in less, theology dying. I am far from saying this in all cases of the private Christian. Even amongst those to whom philosophical

thought is necessary and real, there are few, perhaps, whose trial has not, at some moments, conspicuously been to hold fast—as it were blindly—to truths which, in spite of their own discomfiture and confusion of thought, they felt in their souls to be true. But this cannot be the permanent attitude of theology. It is only under conditions, for a time, that religious conviction can survive what seems like a real inconsistency with the deepest attainable truths and requirements of thought. To men like St. John or St. Paul, or Justin, or Irenæus, or Clement, or Origen, or Athanasius, or Augustine, or Anselm, to understand Christian doctrine was to have fresh and reillumining and rearranging insight into the essentials of thought, into the whole significance of the universe, whereof we ourselves are part; and to interpret it to Christian intellect—however much in the loyalty of the Christian Spirit—was to speak within the region of philosophy.

Theology looks out upon the whole world of consciousness—not upon a separated portion only. Its view cannot but include alike material, and "rational," scientific, and metaphysical, experience of truth. The data of religious revelation cannot but really be in essential correspondence with the data of "reason." Revelation may outstrip reason, and, outstripping, may often illumine, may sometimes perplex it. But that which really contradicts reason becomes an impossibility. We may believe what we cannot understand —or even what appears to contradict our reason—so long only as we have good reason to believe that the contradiction, however apparent, is not real. This was, as it seems, the precise position of the disciples at the close of the sixth chapter of St. John.

Does the doctrine of the Trinity contradict reason really? Or is it rather the key to new vistas of understanding about the nature of being, and the mystery of personality?

How utterly unlike, say to St. Athanasius or St. Augustine, to say either, "Yes, it does really contradict, yet we believe it;" or, "We don't care to ask whether it contradicts or no, for that is a matter indifferent to faith"![1] Everything may, no doubt, be shipwrecked by snatching prematurely at unity. Yet there must ultimately be unity in Christian thought. However much his Christianity may discipline or illumine his philosophy, the Christian is not less a philosopher for being a Christian. Nor are his Christianity and his philosophy two separate compartments, out of all relation

[1] Even the words of the brave paradox with which the rhetorical clauses of Tertullian culminate: "Crucifixus est Dei Filius: non pudet, quia pudendum est. Et mortuus Dei Filius: prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est. Et sepultus resurrexit: *certum est, quia impossibile est*" ("De Carne Christi," V. c.)—words which, apart from their context, may be easily made into nonsense—have, in their context, a meaning which, if paradoxical, is very far removed from irrationalism. Much more so the familiar "Credo ut intelligam" principle of St. Augustine and St. Anselm.

with each other. We may admit that, if Trinitarian doctrine were really unreasonable, it must inevitably go. But we must claim, on the contrary, that it puts the Christian thinker in possession of clues to problems of thought which were otherwise insoluble. If so, this may illustrate for us the absurdity—as, on the one hand, of a theology which is, or tries to be, non-metaphysical, so of a metaphysic which tries to shut out theology.

The metaphysician aims not at system only, but at truth. Now, though Christianity is no product of thinking, it is certain that if the Christian revelation be true, metaphysical thought must be largely affected by it. The metaphysician, no doubt, as metaphysician must work metaphysically; but revealed theology, if true, cannot fail, in many ways, at once to enlarge his insight and to test his conclusions. So much is this the case, that it seems to me that the man

who tries to solve the most important of metaphysical problems otherwise than in conscious accord with Christian theology, adopts a line for his own purpose even more fatal, than that of the man who aspires to be an effective theologian without abstract thought. If it is true that, by excessive dependence upon theology, metaphysic would presently cease to be metaphysical, I must submit that it is even more probable that the metaphysic which, in excessive independence, first ignores and then sets aside the truths of theology, will presently cease to be true.

Now, so far as metaphysicians are open, in fact, to this comment, I should like to consider a little further what it is that they really are doing.

I have distinguished above three strands of rational intelligence—the rational-rational, the rational-moral, and the rational-spiritual. And this distinction I hold to be important

and illuminative, even though it is no sooner made than we have to insist again that the three are not really distinct; they are but facets or aspects of a personality which, however diverse, is more essentially one than it is manifold. Now, it follows from this essential unity that no human activity can be in the one sphere so exclusively as literally or absolutely to exclude the other two. Even when I add one and two, and make three, the I who add them am a spiritual personality, and not merely a calculating machine. It is true that in the simpler arithmetical processes there may seem to be an exceedingly near approach to the abeyance of the moral and spiritual; but it may be doubted whether their real elimination is on any terms possible. And clearly in the higher mathematical study, in the devotion to mathematics which constitutes a life, and a career, and an enthusiasm—the personal character of the man is abundantly concerned

and expressed. In him it is not even apparently the mere exercise of machinery. Devotion, perseverance, enthusiasm, imagination, daring,—these are at least moral, often more than moral, qualities; and it is obvious that there is abundant room for expression of these in even the mathematical work of the earnest mathematician. Of course it is not denied that the immoral man may be a good mathematician. It is not denied that the mathematician exercises his merely intellectual faculties—or rather himself in his merely intellectual aspect—so disproportionately much, that there is obvious danger, unless his interest in his science be balanced by other interests, of a good deal of atrophy of his still more distinctively human powers. But I take mathematics as the subject which seems to be most exclusively and independently intellectual, in order to deny exclusive intellectuality even of it.

The moral qualities evoked in the life of

physical science are far more obvious and direct. There is no study which does not naturally bear upon character. The study of this world's structure and history and movements, its forces and laws, its constituents and products, the wonders of vegetable and animal life, the place of humanity in relation to all, the building of the body and the conditions of its well-being, the relation between body and mind, or again between mind and kosmos,—plainly it is not only indirectly, but in the directest way, that he who is engaged in exploring realities like these is engaged in a work which is not, and cannot be, in the exclusive sense, merely intellectual; it is necessarily also moral (and if moral, at least potentially spiritual also), alike in its subject-matter, in the faculties exercised, and in the insight attained: in such knowledge a man is both using and producing character. I should like, in passing, just to glance at the way in

which the moral and spiritual aspects of physical study may reach a climax of a very noble and inspiring kind in the active profession of medicine—which is not the less directly physical because it is really, through and through, physical in conscious relation to, and dependence on, ulterior objects, which, if physical also in a sense, are, still more, something which transcends, even while it gives its significance to, the physical.

So, in this context, to return to the metaphysician. It would be perfectly monstrous to say that the truth with which he is engaged belongs to the sphere of the exclusively intellectual. It is penetrated, to begin with, through and through with the most consciously explicit and determined moral illuminativeness. Every position has, and is meant to have, and is recognized as having, at least as truly a moral, and a living, as a dryly abstract significance. But we shall have to say much more than this. The mind

which is seriously engaged to determine the relation, in truth, between subject and object; their mutual dependence; the negative character of unrelated existence; the postulates implicitly involved in a mere act of thought, or again, in the conscious conception of a kosmic unity; the meaning or conditions of self-realization—of the particular realizing itself not against, but within, the universal; the true reality of personality; the question whether ultimate being is personal, or how far different persons are different centres of being; whether the goal of being is unipersonal, or in what sense the perfection of all existences is to be identified in a single all-inclusive personality;—the mind, I say, which is absorbed in such questions as these is dealing with problems which not only are plainly moral as much as intellectual, but which will only receive their solution or illumining, either moral or intellectual, within the sphere of the distinctively spiritual.

Essentially the subject-matter is spiritual. In a sense already, in the mere care to raise the questions, spiritual interests and spiritual faculties are appealed to. Here to attempt to shut out, as excluded by hypothesis, spiritual data of knowledge and spiritual methods of insight and working, is to ensure, by hypothesis, intellectual failure.

In claiming the most important part of the metaphysical subject-matter as *ipso facto* theological, I do not, of course, defy a metaphysician, any more than a theologian, to be what we rightly call an immoral and unspiritual man. But I do assert that he is dealing with a subject-matter which it requires not only the rational-intellectual, but the rational-moral and the rational-spiritual faculties and knowledge, rightly to apprehend and to discern. And I cannot but feel that, even whilst proud of their deeply moral and spiritual character, the man who deals with these problems is apt to make it, as it were,

a point of conscience to do his work without the very faculties and assumptions which are most essential to the doing of it. Too often, by way of keeping it consistently intellectual, and as though non-moral and non-spiritual were inseparable attributes of intellect, he sets himself to work with the wrong instruments; to leave out the light of revelation and the insight of faith; to reduce to the terms and conditions of a lower stratum of intellect what belongs to the higher; to read and expound by the intelligent reason of the merely rational and moral intellect what can only be handled aright by the intelligent reason of the spiritual consciousness, discerning the otherwise unattainable heart of truth in loyal accord with the revelation of God.

I do not, of course, mean to suggest that metaphysic should abandon its own forms or methods, or work in such subservience to theology as to lose (as it would lose) all power of either checking or corroborating it; but

that it should, at least, be clearly recognized, first, that metaphysical thought raises questions which to theology are fundamental, and not in doubt; secondly, that to however vast an extent their metaphysical treatment may throw light on theology, or correct the crudeness of theological or quasi-theological misunderstanding,[1] the facts of Revelation, after all, are in origin and history distinct from, and more certain than, the apparent coherence of metaphysical theory; and therefore that theology is a test by which to try our metaphysic, even more than metaphysic is a criticism of the truth of our theology; and thirdly, that whereas the full truth must perfectly harmonize both, a philosophy which explains away the fundamental data and postulates of theology stands condemned,

[1] Take, *e.g.*, the difference between the ruder aspect of belief in "a Personal God" (with the reactions of philosophy or science against it), and the meaning, to science or philosophy, of a conviction that "Supreme Being is Personal" (cf. p. 140).

however plausible in aspect, as a philosophical failure, unless the theology be itself a lie. Metaphysic will not, of course, be a mere department of theology; but theology is as far as possible from being a department of metaphysic. Metaphysic, as metaphysic, must accord with the truth of theology. It certainly cannot, save in dependence on theology, cover for itself the whole theological ground. It is the temptation of metaphysic to explain away what does not fit readily into its own scheme of thought. But metaphysic which is found explaining away leading truths of religious experience, themselves fundamental as inherent postulates in the whole idea of the theology of the Incarnation, is obviously at once, to a Christian, a metaphysical failure. In spite of the natural character and dignity of their subject-matter, thinkers such as these are open to the charge of so yielding themselves disproportionately to the intellectual-rational, or, more probably,

to this and the intellectual-moral (for most morally luminous the intellect often is with which such work is done), as by neglect and disuse to be blunting, at least, if not losing, the finer perceptions of the intellectual-spiritual.

Theologians may often have misstated the meaning of freewill. Philosophy may have done good service in scrutinizing and exposing their misstatements; but what are we to say of a philosophy which denies the reality of what is meant by freewill altogether? Enamoured of its own logical coherence, it snaps its connection with fundamental truth of fact, and sails off into the clouds. Or what can we say of a metaphysic whose premature demand for logical unity drives it first to minimize, then explain away, that first fundamental inward revelation, or necessary counterpart to the revelation, of the holiness of God—the deep, inner, personal, self-accusing conscience of sin? Not

an explaining away, but a deepening, of the conscience of sin is the basis of all religious possibilities, the opening of the spiritual eye to understand revealed truth. It is sin, as sin, real, personal, overwhelming, confounding —not sin in the sense merely of imperfectness, a consciously incomplete stage in the progressive evolution of holiness—which is, as things are, the correlative to Divine Incarnation, and atoning Death, and triumphant reality of Resurrection. Thought which tends more and more to explain away sin, thought which so complacently expounds theology from the standpoint of philosophy as to attenuate, to find diminishing place for, and then on so-called critical or whatever other ground to drop out, finally and altogether, Resurrection, Atonement—in the only sense in which Christian thought ever recognized it, Incarnation,—and therewith the whole Christian Revelation of the Being of God; is thought, on whatever pretence, or

under whatever title, in open, direct, irreconcilable antagonism against everything that Christian theology understands or means. Is not this just the attempt to force the highest spiritual understanding and its subject-matter into the grooves and methods of the merely intellectually intelligent; to work upon it, and expound it completely, just by the faculties which must by hypothesis for ever fall short of that real insight into the truth of God, which will never be luminous in man's intellect save through the spirit, which will never be metaphysically till it is also theologically, all-embracing, coherent, and true?

Conscience of sin, as sin (no less than consciousness of real personal being and will); the inherent need and cry, not for the quickening of natural moral possibilities, but for the more than natural revealing of just the impossible deliverance, the impossible holiness;—all this is too fundamental, as well to human consciousness as to Christian

theology, to be eliminated by the rounding of a logical theory. The metaphysician who rules out the cardinal realities of consciousness and of revelation has his logical reward. But far less even than the theologian who clings to dogmatic truths which he dare not interrogate, and in his narrow thought habitually belittles, will he contribute to that large harmony and coherence of truth, intellectual, moral, and spiritual, which alike they profess to desire.

The things which I have endeavoured to say seem to me important, not only in some remote or abstract sense, but with the most immediate and practical reference. They affect, as I conceive, the attitude towards religious realities, not of a few "thinkers" only—distinctively so called—but of the great majority of ordinary men. Again, they have direct bearing upon every form of educational question, from the question of "undenominationalism"

in Board Schools to that of the true position of theology in a modern university.

I abstain, however, from all attempt at practical applications. Only it may be convenient to add a few words about the relation between spiritual reason and faith. Is there no distinction left? There is certainly no such distinction as to carry the conclusion that faith, at any point, is other than intelligently reasonable. The true intelligence of the spirit can be never in contrast with faith.

Is faith, as faith, to be contrasted with knowledge? With knowledge, experimental or demonstrative, we habitually contrast it; that is, with such knowledge as belongs to the region of the merely rational intellect. But the knowledge which is of faith can be the most absolute and certain form of knowledge. If faith is liable to error when it is isolated, it is no less true that faith may grow in certainty till it is the real inner sight which

overmasters and illuminates the whole being ; the certainty in comparison with which all other certainty (as that fire burns, or that two and two make four), though not uncertain, is yet transient and trivial, hardly for a moment arresting mental interest, because the whole being is intent upon the glory of eternal reality. And we shall not admit that faith, as it thus grows in certainty, dwindles or dissolves as faith. Does any one suppose that St. John was uncertain after all ? or that St. Paul only really had "faith" just so far as he continued to doubt ?

It is true, however, that faith transcends such certainty as belongs to the intellectual taken apart—a physical or a mathematical certainty. It is true, again, that the insight of faith tends naturally to outrun the insight of progressive argument. It precedes, as readily as follows, discernment of coherence. Even in things strictly physical, the faith of a Kepler, or a Harvey, or a Franklin,

or a Watt runs on before the corroborating experiment, or the capacity of articulated demonstration. But the faith which so outruns reason, outruns in the faith that reason essentially does, and will soon discernibly, run full length with it. But, granting this, the thought will at once occur, that when reason has run full length with it, it is no longer faith; the faith is merged in the demonstrated certainty. Yes, it is true. In demonstration, so far as it really amounts to demonstration, faith ceases to be recognized as faith. What such demonstration means is not merely that the belief has been shown to be reasonable, but that it has been shown to be in such relation with what can be manifestly, physically, tested, measured, reproduced within the cognizance of material sense; that the reason which bases itself upon material sense may be dared and defied to find any shelter from, or alternative to, its acceptance. In a word, faith, as

faith, is done away, not by the fact of intelligibleness, but by visible and tangible intelligibleness; it is merged, not in reason, but in sight. Thus the melting of faith in physical or mathematical demonstrableness, does but illustrate, after all, the scriptural language about Faith. The familiar antithesis between faith and reason, however constantly made on all sorts of sides, is as unscriptural as it is false in itself and misleading in effect. Scripture, here, as often, untinged by errors imbedded deeply in current language and thought, while it knows no such thing as antithesis between reason and faith—how should it, if He who is the great Object of faith is the Word and the Wisdom of God?—conceives of faith as in contrast only with sight.

To return, then, for a moment to the question asked just now about St. John and St. Paul. Certainly their faith did not, that it might be faith, require some element in their souls of doubt. But it did, I suppose, require

a certain natural capacity of doubting. Man's nature (it is to be remembered) is ambiguous. He is two- or three- or four-fold, if not as vitally, yet as really, as he is one. And in this ambiguity of his present nature he lives in a visible, external surrounding, which is capable of challenging his attention as if it were the primary or the whole truth. As long as he lives in this world there is a *prima facie* completeness to be transcended by his loyalty of insight—an insight of the whole man, reason, character, spirit, into the highest and the truest truth. When this ambiguity is wholly dissolved; when there is no longer a *prima facie* external which is even capable of deluding, or needs to be transcended, any more at all; when faith is not only coincident with the highest reason, but coextensive also with that which corresponds to immediate sight;—then, indeed, we no longer term it faith, but sight, or fruition—the beatification of the open vision of God.

On reflection, it must be owned that all higher convictions and impulses of the moral or spiritual kind, in the Agnostic or Atheist as well as in the Christian, belong to the order of things "invisible." Such convictions of Agnostic or Atheist, in the order of things unseen, do not in them in any wise contrast with reason. As far as they go towards truth they *are* reason, and reason finds its expression in them. And to the Christian also, who discerns that *quâ* moral conscience and *quâ* spiritual personality no less than *quâ* rational intellect he sees and explores and knows—seeing truth, and truth from truth; though the intuition of faith outrun oftentimes the articulation of reason, yet essentially his faith *is* reason; and his reason, in its higher convictions and insights as reason, till the outward setting visibly correspond with the inner certainties, is still justly termed faith.

REASON IN RELATION TO CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES.

[*Portions of a sermon preached as introductory to a set of lectures on "Christian Evidences."*]

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. . . I AM to speak as in introduction to the work of a Christian Evidence Society. Now, Christian evidences may be said, as such, to be an appeal distinctively to the intellect; the business rather of the reason than the conscience, of the head than the heart. On the other hand, it is clear that it is not only the reason or intellect—it is at least as much the heart and conscience of men—that we, as Christian witnesses, desire to convince. Indeed, objection is sometimes taken on principle to anything like an argumentative Christianity—any appeal which can be

scornfully described as "logical." It is love, we are reminded, not logic, that will make the Christian. Again and again, we are told, ten thousand instances have proved that when every argument had been tried and failed, it was Christian sympathy that leapt past the barriers of the heart; it was the warm real touch of love without, at which, beyond all hope, love burst into flame within, and in the melting of love the soul was transformed and convinced. No doubt; it is true; we readily concede all this. But does it follow, indeed, that therefore the argumentative appeal to evidence is an appeal in vain? Or, if we know that it does not, why does it not?

We might make answer, no doubt, by drawing sharply the distinction between man's different powers—between the reason, the affection, and the will; by conceding, indeed, to the heart and its affections a place of primary greatness, yet pleading that at least the reason *also* has its sphere, and in its

sphere its necessities; we might urge that even if it be *through* the affections, and in the second instance, yet reason has to be convinced; that it asks questions, and must in its turn be satisfied; that even if reason touch not the highest regions, yet spiritual truths must not be *irrational*, and therefore not only that in the sphere of reason special charges must be met, special difficulties explained, but the essential coherence of religious truth, with the utmost that reason is capable of, must be shown; and so that there still remains for intellectual argument a work which, even if subordinate, is none the less essential.

All this, no doubt, is, in its own way, true. Yet this is not quite what I desire to say to-day. For this depends too much upon the sharpness of distinction between the intellectual and the spiritual sides of man's nature. What I should prefer to say, tends rather, as I hope, to draw them nearer together.

When Christian believers, fired with the glow of a burning heart-conviction, disparage by comparison the merely intellectual aspect of their faith; or when sceptics, disparaging everything that is not intellectual, challenge us to convince their reason alone, distrusting devotion, enthusiasm, and every kind of deeper experience, as so many perversions and disturbances to the rightful sovereignty of pure reason; are not both guilty, more or less, in the fact that both imply the possibility of abstracting reason, and dealing with it, in isolation by itself,—guilty of what is really both an intellectual and a practical mistake? No doubt there is a sense in which we can think of any two things apart —the eye apart from the brain, the concave apart from the convex, the world apart from its course; so, if we please, we can by mental analysis distinguish in man not only the body and the soul, but also the soul and the spirit; the affections, the reason and

the will; the judgment and the conscience, and so forth: yet we need to be reminded that these several so-called parts of a compound nature are not parts like the parts of a building, aggregated but separable; they are more like the different qualities of a flame which *is* burning and *is* light; they are so many aspects or workings of one central reality, distinguishable only in idea, but in fact indivisible for ever. The reason in any man is no abstract power, separable from himself. His reason is the reason of a person. *It is a person*, viewed in respect of his consciously intelligent insight. It is *himself intelligent, himself understanding.* But he himself, as an intelligent being, having insight and understanding, cannot be separate from what he himself is. The intelligence may, indeed, be trained to do certain special duties which seem to have little relation with the character of the man; but the intelligence, as a whole, in its widest

meaning and range—the total man's power of perceiving, assimilating, knowing—cannot be independent—nay, it is itself but one aspect—of what the total man is.

If we are to say that evidences, or judgment upon evidences, are really affairs of the intelligence, we must at the same time give its full range of meaning to the word "intelligence." We must not shut it off as a mere, perhaps narrow, department of man's conscious nature; for it is as wide as is his consciousness, except in so far as we admit that there are elements in his consciousness which would be rightly described as *un*intelligent. Evidences? They are, indeed, of more kinds than one. There are some kinds of evidence, of which a man (if there were one) without any character at all, a mere calculating machine, neither soul nor spirit, would be the best and most unerring judge.

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It is, then, not only the evidence that is different in this case; the faculty of apprehending and pronouncing upon the evidence (though in name identified) is different also. There are elements in the evidence which are not patient at all of a strictly logical or mathematical statement; which words cannot fully express, though they may indicate, but *indicate only to the moral perceptions* of those who have a moral apprehension. For, indeed, merely external facts, though given with photographic exactness, can never be evidence, apart from the intelligent insight which gives interpretation to them. That interpretative power which makes them relevant, and gives them meaning—the unifying, vivifying creativeness of intelligence—flashes out upon them from within, from the personal apprehension which takes cognizance of them. And therefore, in a case like this, the part of the evidence that could be made intelligible to an intellect wholly non-moral,

would be but an insignificant fraction of the whole.

If these things be true at all, they may perhaps, at least, suggest a further step. I have spoken of moral experience. The Christian religion believes in possibilities higher still than this. If St. Paul found Christians whose Christianity knew nothing of the life of the Holy Spirit, he could but ask them in amazement, "Unto what then were ye baptized?" If there be any truth at all in this higher aspiration, this belief in spiritual life, which is what life in the Church of Christ *means*, it is only natural to suppose that something analogous will be true in this case also. If the truths of a religion which is spiritual, not less than historical, be a question of "evidences," to be decided by the "reason," yet neither the evidences which have to be understood and pronounced upon, nor the reason which has to sit in judgment upon them, are in all points wholly identical

in kind with the evidence produced, or the intelligence pronouncing, in matters into which no spiritual element enters.

Do we suggest, then, that spiritual truths are to be apprehended by something that is other than intelligent? other than intelligence? No; not for a moment. Any more than morality which is not, above all things, intelligent, could pronounce in a moral perplexity. Intelligence, reason, it must essentially be—but it must be spiritual intelligence; intelligence of which spiritual sensitiveness, spiritual experience, forms a vital element; intelligence which, uninformed spiritually, would be *un*intelligent—would be "foolishness"—on a spiritual subject-matter; in a word, no mere abstract intelligence, but the intelligence *of a spiritual personality.*

There are parts, indeed, of the teaching of Jesus Christ, of which it was characteristic, that they habitually appeared to the dry light of the reasonable Jews to be not

untrue only, but essentially unreasonable. I can but refer in general terms to the third, the sixth, and the eighth chapters of St. John. But it is not only that there are some subjects which are more exclusively spiritual. It is not only that it is worse than useless to bring in the shrewdness of the counting-house or of the laboratory, in order to gauge aright the character of regeneration or of penitence, or to measure the possibilities of sacramental grace: such a question as that of the presentment in the Gospels of the story of the Incarnate Life,—even that of the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, which may seem, above all, to be a question of the barest historical fact,—is none the less mixed in character. In the full appreciation of the evidence there are elements involved deeper than the merely historical ones—considerations which go to the root of our spiritual consciousness. It is vain to protest against them. They are there. The

evidence which omits them, however conscientiously marshalled, will still be but part of the whole.

It is no bare fact, the fact of the resurrection of Jesus Christ. It cannot be separated from what it means, and is. It is full of meanings—meanings which interpret and illuminate, and receive again illumining interpretation from, every deeper craving and experience of man. All history led to it, culminated in it, is explained by it; all history, not the outward history only of kingdoms and peoples, but the inner record of man—man's failure and need, man's progress, aspiration, possibility, man's self-sacrifice, sanctification, blessedness—hinge and depend on it. There are points in its total evidence which can be more truly apprehended by an old woman practising self-denial for love's sake, or a penitent tender from his first humiliating confession, than by the most consummate mathematician, or metaphysician, or

logician in the world. Something in this direction perhaps all would allow. My point is that the difference between them is not merely one of moral or spiritual excellence—that the penitent or the old woman excels not merely in *deserving*, but in *capacity* (in a certain direction) for rational apprehension; the difference is *in the intelligence* as well as in the character. The intelligence of a rational animal, the intelligence of a moral consciousness, the intelligence of a spiritual personality, though one in name, are in content and quality not identical.

What does our Lord Jesus Christ mean when He says, "I thank Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that Thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding, and didst reveal them unto babes;" and, "If any man willeth to do His will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God;" and, "It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing: the words that I

have spoken unto you are spirit, and are life"?[1]

I must not, indeed, stay to illustrate; but there are one or two things more to be said.

This first. It is by no means suggested that one man *is* simply a rational animal; another is a morally conscious being; and a third, alone of the three, is a spiritual personality. On the contrary, I suppose that every one of these three assertions may probably be made, with more or less truth, of every man living; but at least these three strands of the complex being may, and do, predominate very varyingly in varying persons; and, with corresponding variety, their powers of intelligent apprehension in different directions do differ not quantitatively only but qualitatively—not in degree only, but in kind.

Again, if there is a sense in which we

[1] St. Matt. xi. 25; St. John vii. 17, vi. 63; cf. 1 Cor. i. 18–31, ii. 11–16, etc., etc.

protest against abstracting reason from the individual personalities reasoning, and insist that with varieties of character it too, and its possibilities, will be found to vary, this does not mean an ultimate scepticism as to the unity or reality of reason; it will not end by making every person a standard of reason to himself. No; man may differ from man, while all are imperfect, in quality as well as quantity of intelligent reason. But the different qualities are not ultimately in contrast; in their highest perfection they are transfused into one world-embracing unity; all the wisdom that seemed merely intellectual is seen to be moral also; all the moral, tinged with new force and fire, is transfigured into celestial glory. All are spiritual *then*, when the world and all that is in it has plainly become a working, and therefore a revelation, of the eternal God.

For the reason which the processes of the universe are found to obey; the reason which

discerns and appreciates some sequences of fact as moral laws; the reason in which certain revelations as to holiness and sin, pardon and love, and the being and character of God, find their profound reflection and acceptance; —all this is but an echo, more or less complete and true, in the spirit of man, of the Supreme Reason—the Reason, or Wisdom, or Utterance (λόγος) of God. "For she is the brightness of the everlasting Light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of His goodness. And being but one, she can do all things: and remaining in herself, she maketh all things new: and in all ages entering into holy souls, she maketh them friends of God, and prophets. For God loveth none but him that dwelleth with Wisdom."[1] This is He in whose image man was made; without whom "was not anything made that was made;" "who being the brightness of His glory, and the express image of His

[1] Wisdom vii. 26–28.

Person, and upholding all things by the word of His power, . . . sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high."

"Then spake Jesus again unto them, saying, I am the Light of the world." So the great words of challenge ring out to our intellects and consciences still. They are the challenge of the religion of Jesus Christ to the world. There is in them no call to abnegation, no limiting of the freedom or power of intellect. But there is a warning that the perfect way of intellect lies in a direction otherwise than men might have supposed; that the intellect cannot in the end be abstracted from the total character; that the intellect is only perfectly intellectually true when it is perfectly in harmony with other necessities and powers of the personal life; when intellect and conscience, mind and will, the logical, the moral, the spiritual capacities, are but different aspects of one central light, and that light a true reflection from the perfectness

of light wherefrom it came;—there is a warning, in short, that the way of intellect will be missed after all, except it be found, in its highest culmination, to coincide with an absolute homage—mental, moral, and spiritual, all in one—to the Divine glory of One who, though more, was, and is, unique for ever amongst and above men. Study, then, in thought and word and deed; study, with all the fulness of homage of which you are capable, the Personality of Jesus Christ. He Himself promises you, in this, the light of life. And, indeed, He Himself absolutely demands this of you. There *are* those—and I challenge you to find an alternative, I do not say more lovely, more winning, more beautiful, but more strictly according to the exigencies of the highest reason,—there *are* those who so feel His measureless superiority, and the unconditioned allegiance which they, in every fibre of their nature, owe to Him, as to know that intellectual subordination to

Him, if at any time they cannot follow Him, is no degradation, but a glory to themselves and their intellect—for intellect is only perfectly illumined in harmony with goodness, and this is a step towards the harmony which so illumines; nay, who would even, if the paradox could conceivably represent anything but paradox, rather ten thousand times, for Reason's own sake, be as fools in conjunction with Him, than wise with the uttermost wisdom that could conceivably be apart from Him—Him who, intellectually, morally, and spiritually, is their supreme perfection and their God.

REASON AND THEOLOGY.

"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God."—ST. JOHN i. 1.

POSSIBLY it would be right to begin with some form of apology for venturing to prefix to any sermon whatever words of import so vast as these. Nevertheless, however much, from the outset, the text must shame the discourse, it may yet be true that no words would connect themselves more directly with such thoughts as the discourse would fain try to suggest. For I desire to speak a little of what, for us, the very term "theology" means; and of some of the characteristics which differentiate the study of it from other fields of human study or knowledge.

"In the beginning was the Word." If I venture to set out from this verse of St. John,

need I begin by reminding you, in connection with this verse, how much wider is the scope of the Λόγος of St. John than of the English "Word"? However true it may be that the title, as used by St. John, has its direct and primary reference to revealed utterance rather than to indwelling wisdom, that the Λόγος to him is "Word" rather than "Reason," yet it must needs remain that whatever of truth was meant, or was being felt after, in the Hebrew personification of Wisdom, or the Greek speculation as to underlying Reason or Mind, is still necessary within both the verbal scope and the religious truth of the Λόγος, as it hardly can be within the English "Word."

"The Word was with God, and the Word was God." A wonderful commentary, then, upon the name Θεολογία, is for us in these words with which the verse culminates, Θεὸς ἦν ὁ Λόγος.

"The Word, the Λόγος, was God." This,

with the context of the next few verses, is vindication indeed of language, of reason, of mind. Whatever there is in the human mind of reasonable consciousness, whatever capacity there is in human utterance of expression of the living character within, is it, in its ultimate nature, tentative, or capricious, or illusory? The illuminative light of human consciousness or character, if ever or wherever these realize without perversion their own true being, is the Λόγος, who is the "effulgence of the glory, the very image of the substance" of God.

"The Word was God." In the revelation of these words is found the essential, because the Divine, informing reason of scientific inquiry and knowledge; they are the guarantee that those who seek may find the working out of a Divine process in language and literature and history; or, again, that the insight of metaphysical thought is a Divine insight into the character of existence.

Though there be ten thousand distinguishable branches of thought or knowledge, yet all forms of thought or knowledge meet in this, that they are all Divine, and their Divineness is the ultimate truth of them all.

They all are Divine. Again, this attribute of Divineness is no mere abstraction, no neutral or dead word. Word, Wisdom, Reason, Λόγος—it is the expression of the life of God. The God whom it expresses is alive, is reality of being, is life; is all that our dim consciousness of being, of personality, really means. Our reason is reasonable; our character is moral; our personality is personal, is free—just so far as each truly reflects what possibility, character, wisdom are in Him, the expression of whose living Personality they are.

There is, then, a sense in which theology is quite literally the *Scientia Scientiarum*, as actually including every thought that is true. Nevertheless, most knowledge is not approached from the side of theology; and

there are reasons, no doubt, why it is, at the least, convenient that it should be so. Indeed, though all scientific methods presuppose the unity of reason—a postulate which belongs immediately to metaphysic, and ultimately to theology—for all ordinary purposes the scientific method stands in contrast against the theological. The scientific method of knowledge, while it implicitly takes for granted the whole rational process and machinery alike of our own minds, and (I must add) of the universe which it explores, finds much of its robust strength in the explicit refusal to take for granted, in any other direction, either specific facts or interpretations of the meaning of facts.

So splendid have been the achievements of this method, that we are accustomed to meet, and need to be on our guard against, not merely a claim for the acceptance of scientific results within their own sphere, but (what is more formidable) a claim that the scientific

canons and methods of thought, and the hypotheses upon which they work, are the only canons and hypotheses upon which knowledge can be based. We are met, I say, by such a claim. Often, perhaps, it would be more accurate to say that, without the formulation of any such claim, we are met by a widespread instinct, more imperious still because more unconscious of condition or limit, that all thought or knowledge whatever must work upon these assumptions and methods only. Of the assumptions I have, so far, already spoken. Mind is assumed, within and without, everywhere; and character, so far at least as it is indispensable for the discipline and working of mind. But while the existence of truth is so far assumed, the content of truth is not. Rather it is as the primary condition of the scientific method to assume nothing as true beyond the fact of truth and mind itself. The building up of knowledge is a gradual and progressive achievement.

Mind feels its way by patient observation and reflection everywhere. Its method is hypothetical, tentative, inductive. It is a process of perpetual evolution, of endless advance, magnificent indeed in actual results, yet such as can hardly be thought of except as a finite advance towards a total practically, for us, infinite. Moreover, in most branches of knowledge, even the truths that are most definitely ascertained are still, in a certain sense, tentative. The most dogmatic principles are acquired principles, inductively built up; and however little we can practically believe that future discoveries of truth could qualify, or, by dwarfing, seem to supersede them, such a contingency is never, at least in the abstract, inconceivable; nor would it, if realized, contradict or overthrow, but rather enrich the more, the whole fabric of knowledge.

Is it true, then, that assumptions or canons of thought, based upon the experience of

acquisition of knowledge such as this, can be transferred into the sphere of distinctive theology and found to work livingly or fruitfully there?

No doubt it is perfectly possible, in reference to the subject-matter and history of religion, to construct a scientific inquiry of a strictly inductive kind. It is possible to inquire into the origin and development of the religious sense; into the history and phenomena of religious beliefs; into the consequences, as observable in character and life (so far as these things can be observed from without), which are, or seem to be, the outcome of different forms and developments of creed. The mental attitude necessary for such a study as this may be, in strict accordance with the assumptions and canons of scientific thought, an attitude of perfectly impartial equilibrium — convinced, indeed, that truth of some kind will be ultimately evolved from the careful study of religious

phenomena, but unbiassed by any personal religious loyalty ; and rather assuming that truth, if found among practical religious societies, must be found as distributed somewhere amongst them all, and likely to be at once most seriously endangered by the surrender of complete allegiance to any.

Upon a study, such as this, of creeds, or types of character as moulded by creeds, upon the assumption on the part of the student,—at least for his scientific purposes as student,—of a stringent mental neutrality, I make no other comment for the present but this, that whatever its place or value may be in the intellectual life of the community, or of individuals, it has at all events hardly anything, if anything, in common with the study of Christian theology. I do not disparage its use, or in many cases its necessity. Nevertheless it could only be by some confusion of thought that a study such as this could be ranged under the heading of theology.

It can only become theology when the entire Christian hypothesis, and with it all idea or hope of the possibility of any theology properly so called, has first been explicitly laid aside.

For Christian theology differs from such a study as this, not accidentally but fundamentally; differs in its hypotheses, in the character of its certainties, and therefore in the nature of its canons, and the direction of its processes, of thought. If the scientific method is inductive and evolutionary, Christian theology is characteristically deductive: that is to say, it is based fundamentally not so much upon a gradual edifice of religious ideas, a process of tentative conjectures, more or less satisfactorily verified in experience, whilst, bit by bit, they slowly advance towards some far-off goal of remote theological certainty; but rather upon the actual manifestation of a historic life, accepted as Divine. Whatever may have led up to

this acceptance in the history of the individual, theology begins as theology from the acceptance of this life as a Divine revelation, and its central work consists in the exploration and appreciation of the consequences, not to the intellect only but to the entire character, which flow out from such acceptance. Theology, however minutely she may explore and verify it, does not set out, with blank mind, to make discovery of this fact, or of the essential interpretation of it. It is from this fact, and from the Divine interpretation of it, that theology starts. It is upon this that theology, as such, is based. Now, to say this, does not mean that theology is out of relation with the inductive achievements of *à priori* reason. On the contrary, the main fact and character of these is taken for granted, as the necessary substructure and preliminary to theology. As it was not, historically, until after the work of Greek thought and Hebrew discipline of character, that God was

revealed in Christ; so, intellectually, is it always true that Christian theology does not set aside but rather postulates and assumes the preliminary work of reason,—its inherent interrogativeness, its demands, enigmas, efforts,—and (so far as it has reached them) achievements. Theology, as a system of thought addressed to the reason, presupposes the conditions, the necessities, and the struggles of reason as unillumined by revelation. Nor are the processes of reason checked in the least, but stimulated and fortified, in the light of this revelation. The revelation itself is not the revelation of a dead text, but of a living Person,—a revelation as multiform, as inexhaustible, as life. Still, whatever the Christian theologian may have to say—and he has doubtless much—about the relation of reason to theology, it remains fundamentally true that the basis and certainty of his theological work rests not so much upon the interrogation of inductive experience,

as upon the acceptance and study of a revealed Life.

To him, indeed, the very antithesis will ultimately be a formal rather than a real one. To him it is clear that the work of preliminary reason only finds its verification and completeness, as its otherwise insoluble problems only find their solution, in the theology which flows out from the acceptance of the revealed Life. Still, his basis is the revelation even more than the induction: and so far, in scientific theology, the process of other study seems to be reversed. It follows that, as judged from the point of view of secular science, the methods and hypotheses of theology must appear sometimes anomalous.

Theology, as a system of intellectual thought, if wholly apart from revelation, would be at its best of the nature of metaphysic—an attempt to build up conviction as to the ultimate meaning of life and consciousness from the various data

which experience supplies; but chiefly from the interrogation of the phenomenon of consciousness itself—and its character, and the postulates which are involved in it. For this must always be the primary—nay, in some sense (however largely interpreted by history or science) the all-inclusive, the ultimate as well as the primary—datum of those who fain would know the source and the goal, the meaning and character, the value and destiny of the life of man's conscious spirit. Now, no one who honestly, however externally, studies Christianity, can fail to see that for the Christian intellect, the conditions of this explanation are transformed by the revealed Life. If that, the fundamental Christian hypothesis, is true, thought hangs no longer helpless in mid-air. There is at once a real source and goal. The exemplar, the ideal, *exists*, at once of human reason and of moral character;—and of both at once because of either; and of both not as really two, but

rather as inseparable aspects of one. It exists—nay, it is the reality of existence.

And as to the meaning of the ideal exemplar, which is the all-inclusive reality; the Incarnate Life by what it reveals and involves of the Being of God,—the essential unity, yet threefoldness in unity, of mutually inclusive personalities, the inherent self-relatedness in eternal Being—becomes itself, even on the side of mere intellect, however much not discoverable, nay, even (if you will) imperfectly apprehensible by mere intellect, yet becomes the solution of the hitherto insoluble enigmas, the crowning and perfecting of the insight, nay, of the very capacity, of intellect. The Christian theologian cannot but claim, not only that his illuminative revelation is in most perfect accord with reason's reasonableness, but moreover that reason itself has never found its own reasonable vindication or completeness elsewhere; that, so far from

stultifying or superseding reason, it alone lifts reason up to the true level of reason's own highest independence or capacity as reason.

If, then, the theologian's attitude or method are different, perhaps even anomalous, from the point of view of the assumptions and hypotheses of the scientific mind, ordinarily so called, it can never be true to the theologian that theological truth, because based upon revelation, and therefore in its characteristic method deductive, is, intellectually speaking, on a lower or less rational level than the truths of inductive exploration. On the contrary, to him it is reason which is instantly hemmed in and fettered in its capacity, whenever, whether in the name of reason or on any other ground, it shuts out the hypothesis of revelation, and endeavours to struggle with the complexity of life and thought alone. Reason, taken apart as reason, is reason by hypothesis dwarfed.

Intellect really isolated can, in fact, apprehend nothing, except so far as there are propositions quite exclusively intellectual. But no truth that is not narrowed down by artificial abstraction is an exclusively intellectual truth, and, apart from the region of abstractions, isolated intellect is intellect incapacitated. If mere intellect cannot thrill to the bracing joy of moral effort or victory; cannot put meaning into the overshadowing conscience of sin, or the new dawning of life in the sense of pardon, acceptance, sanctification; cannot enter at all into the wonders of the consciousness of loving and being loved; it is assuredly true that intellect, taken apart as intellect, is without the very capacities of consciousness by which *the intellect of the spiritual consciousness* sees and knows. But it is in this insight of the intellect of the spiritual consciousness that alone mere intellect rests from its weary round of Tantalus' labours, and finds itself not quenched,

discouraged, superseded, but satisfied, illuminated, reconciled; its old efforts after truth all included, its old antinomies harmonized, its old aspirations glorified, its old impossibilities melted away.

You remember the mathematical puzzle of the race between the hare and the tortoise—the hare which ran ten yards while the tortoise ran one; the tortoise which nevertheless, *usque ad infinitum*, was always one-tenth of its old distance ahead, as often as ever the tortoise had cancelled the former arrears. As in that puzzle by the abstract and arbitrary hypothesis of an infinite subdivision, the possibility of which was hypothetical and abstract only, the intellect was (as it were) walled in, and could never get outside the artificial limitation of a hypothesis purely imaginary; so reason, regarded as the reason of a being only rational, and not recognizing yet that its own highest possibilities as reason belong

to it only as it is the reason of a moral consciousness, nay, of a spiritual personality, is retained in the old circle of barrenness and hopelessness by the artificial hypothesis, the unreal abstraction, which would separate off the reason as a non-moral, non-spiritual thing; and so, by the attempt to regard reason merely as rational, stunt all the highest capacities of reason itself.

But to return from what is in part a digression, though hardly an unimportant one, as to what reason is from the point of view of revelation. If the basis of theology be the revelation of a Person, whose Personality is a revelation of God: if therein all the old processes and problems of reason go on, not checked but taken up, steadied, completed, crowned in the light that flows from the revelation; and the scrutiny, meanwhile, of the truths, or aspects of truth, which do follow from acceptance of the revelation, is in its character, as I have urged, a deductive more

than an inductive scrutiny: it will follow that theology, if it is to be theology at all, if it is not to abandon its own characteristic being, and throwing the revealed Life to the winds, to become once more a metaphysical speculation, or further still from its own essential nature, a mere inquiry, intellectually impartial, because morally and spiritually uninformed, into the phenomena and history of religious creeds and societies, must be built upon a hypothesis of certain truth: and as possessing, and based upon, definite truths, must have, at the core of its life, such a reality as the old word orthodoxy represents. There must be such a thing as an orthodoxy if there is to be a theology. However difficult it may seem to be to determine what is orthodox, whatever confusion may have arisen amid diverse judgments embodied in diverse societies: whatever *excuse* there may therefore be for the easy assumption of external criticism, that an orthodoxy must be

a narrowness and an error in itself: it remains true, after all, that theology without a deposit of truth, without therefore some data of definite creed in reference to which individual judgments may differ as orthodox from heterodox, as true from determinably false, would be not theology at all, but a sea once more of endless speculation, on which Reason, not exalted but degraded, as well as disabled, by setting out alone, would toss and wander, compassless and rudderless, in eternal and pathetic impotence of effort. It is only so far as bodies of men can agree upon the contents of an orthodoxy, that it is possible for them to share in a theology. If different bodies hopelessly disagree, they can, indeed, have their diverse theologies, corresponding to their diverse views of orthodoxy, but they can have no common content of theology. Nor can those claim a theology at all to whom the word orthodoxy has no meaning. Herein is a contrast, characteristic

and fundamental, between the conditions, necessary from the very outset, for theology, or for other fields of speculation and knowledge, viewed apart from theology—a contrast which issues directly from the fact that the basis of any Christian theology is in the revelation of a Personal Life, accepted as Divine.

So far I have tried, however imperfectly, to enlarge upon what is really one single thought only, the character of Christian theology as based upon revelation rather than induction. But there are other thoughts which I should desire at least to mention along with this. The very phrase, "revelation of a Personal Life," carries us really much further. For a person can only be known by personal intimacy and interchange. Only a person can know a person; and the knowledge of a person can never be a knowledge merely intellectual. As a living person could not really be intelligible to mind

divorced from moral character, but community of life and experience and affection is, through avenues conscious or unconscious, the method of realizing personal knowledge; so Christian theology, being what it is in fact, the knowledge of a personality revealed in human life, cannot, in the nature of its own essential being, be ever adequately measured or appraised by the comparative method, from without. An impartial science of comparative religions, so far from rising intellectually beyond it, or above it, necessarily falls back—as from the moral so from the intellectual conditions, which are indispensable for capacity of understanding it. It is, of inexorable necessity, only from within, only by intercourse of personal affection and communion, that its revelation can be, in any real measure, intelligible. But I do not attempt to dwell further upon a thought which has been so strikingly interpreted from this pulpit not many months since.

To some extent I have dwelt already upon the thought that the highest truth would not be apprehensible by mere intellect, even if there were, or could be, such a thing as intellect abstracted from content of personal character. Nowhere is this truth so clear, nowhere is the inadequacy of pure intellect, even for intelligence, so conspicuous as in the subject-matter of theology. I suppose it is universally true that there is as truly character in intellect, as intellect in character; but what is elsewhere discernible, just perhaps indicatively, is true with overwhelming directness here. It is the long discipline of the moral character by which the eyes of the understanding are opened. I said just now that theology must have an orthodoxy. Of course I do not deny that there is an orthodoxy which is blind, conceited, unintelligent; the substitute of indolence or cowardice for intelligence and honesty. But possession, real and intelligent, of spiritual truth, is as

plainly a moral as an intellectual thing. It is only by moral affinity, real likeness of moral character in the apprehending intelligence, that moral truth can be really apprehended. It is only by that deeper spiritual reality of which moral consciousness is the immediate expression, which itself is the origin and root, the key and the crown of moral consciousness, that truths which transcend the conditions of present existence, or seem at first sight to contradict common logic; truths such as Atonement or moral reality of effectual pardon; truths such as Regeneration, or Sacramental feeding on the Body and Blood of a Divine Humanity; truths such as Resurrection, or Eternity of being; cease to be, as at first sight they seemed to be, meaningless nonsense, and become in very deed, to the soul, illuminating and transforming, transcendent and eternal, realities.

It is correspondingly, on the other hand,

the penalty of aspirations after spiritualism, which are not the crown and perfecting of moral experience, to stand self-condemned as both intellectual and moral rubbish.

True theological apprehension postulates not the ingenious exercise of a single faculty, but the allegiance of the whole man. Nay, there is often more theological insight in moral dutifulness, though it seem unintellectual, than in the most ingenious hypotheses of an intelligence which seems to be independent, because it is deficient in moral dutifulness.

Again, as nowhere else is the inadequacy of the intellect so conspicuous if abstracted from the total of the intelligent person, so nowhere else is the individual personality so inadequate if taken apart from the community. As reason, for us, is *without* each apprehending intellect before it is *within* it, and the life of humanity precedes that of our own several human experience, and the

capacities as well as rights of the individual are in large measure what his membership of a society has made them; so Christian theology is for men as joint members of a Catholic Church. If on the one hand it is true, and strikingly true, that theological insight, like all other Divine insight into knowledge and character, comes to the corporate body through the inspired mind and life of individuals, it is none the less true that the individual mind or conscience apprehends, and acquires apprehensiveness, in and through both the moral discipline of gregarious life, and the intellectual dutifulness of lowly Church membership. True theological insight can never be the pride of individual ingenuity. Theology always has been as a historical fact—must we not add, theology by its inherent necessity always must be?—the theology of a coherent corporate body, the illuminative knowledge and light of a Church.

So incompatible with the true insight of theology is the secret lust after intellectual eminence or independency, that it has been, in all ages of the Church, an experience characteristic at once and most pitiful, that those who seemed, it may be, in all other respects, both of intellect and character, the most richly qualified to interpret Divine truths to men, yet warped, a little and a little, by a vein of individual ambition of intellect, where there should have been loyal and lowly dutifulness, have after all been eminent only to mislead and to perplex, to distract and to divide, the minds and hearts of their brethren. Again and again this one failing has availed to turn what should have been the very light of heaven into the misleading lanterns of the marsh and the wilderness. Though Divine insight be through individuals, it is never as an individual property. Nothing could be more anomalous than an esoteric Christian theology,

the secret intellectual pride of a few; and nothing is more pitiful than the spectacle of the shipwreck of theologians in whose theological intelligence the element was lacking of dutiful loyalty. Divine truth is the animating possession of a corporate Church; and the man who sets himself apart from the Body, loses the inner touch of the life which illuminates and informs the members of the Body. We have known it in ancient history. We know it only too familiarly in modern Europe. If independence is, in one sense, a necessary note of intellectual as of moral strength, in a sense that is but slightly perverted it is the characteristic snare and ruin of intellectual people. To be independent, if dutifulness demands it, is the very test of strength. But a vein of desire for independence of intellect is already the beginning of dissolution. The solidarity of humanity, the deep interdependence of man with man, the inadequacy, nay, the disaster of the

individual, if taken apart as a solitary being, when he was made for orderly membership in a mighty living and life-giving whole—if it is sufficiently noticeable elsewhere, is nowhere more conspicuously or peremptorily true than it is in the study of Christian theology.

What then? Are thoughts like these thoughts of discouragement more than of inspiration? or are they in any way far-fetched, or uncertain, or unnecessary? "The Word was with God, and the Word was God." If the opening verses of St. John be not folly, but Divine insight, how can Christian theology be less than (in proportion as it is realized) a positive certainty, a communing of the illumined soul with truth? Do not, then, be misled into vainly imagining that theology can be either constructed or maintained on the basis of wide information about opinion, as distinguished from dutiful submission to the truth as true. Do not be

taken in by the shallow fancy that mental indifference is higher intellectually than surrender, independence than devotion, or that the *rôle* of all-tolerating indifference is possible to the Christian theologian. Devotion to the truth is not lowered or fettered because it sets out with the most immovable certainty that its own quest is neither quixotic nor indefinite—that the truth *is*, is reality of existence, is perfection of life; life in whose realized completeness, intellectual wisdom, personal goodness, the boundlessness of spiritual capacity, are no longer even imaginably separate; they are aspects of a unity which is each one of them simultaneously, perfectly; they can differ only as diverse manifestations of a Being essentially One.

Again, if the Word be God, how could devotion to that Word be the devotion only of a single faculty of man's being, and that neither the highest element in his being, nor

that which is most characteristically himself? How could devotion be devotion, if it were of the intellect more than of the character and the will? But if theological truth thus necessarily makes its demand upon the whole man, it also exalts the whole man. Every faculty that it uses, it braces and purifies. If the inadequacy of an isolated faculty, as intellect, is nowhere so conspicuous; nowhere, on the other hand, is the intellect so refined and perfected as intellect, as here where it begins to be identified with the moral conscience, while it abdicates every dream of individual eminence for ever, in loyal submission to the eternal lordship of a Living and Loving Truth.

Again, it hardly even seems an addition to these thoughts, so much is it implied in them already, that theology throws a man back upon his fellows; its insight is only possible to those who, as brethren amongst brethren, have learnt the discipline of a life

of love. It requires a lowliness of intellect as well as of action ; the lowliness of the man who, though he thinks, and prays, and learns, and judges for himself, yet does so with even increasing distrust of his separate sufficiency ; whose insight into real good gives him keen conscience of moral imperfectness ; whose conscience of moral imperfectness makes intellectual self-assertion impossible ; who would be not elated but dismayed to find himself moving towards apparent contradiction—I will not say necessarily of the majority of surrounding Churchmen, but of that Apostolic and Catholic Church in whose Divine foundation and guidance he believes.

Only one word more. On such a representation as I have endeavoured to make, you may tell me that it is difficult indeed to search and find, here or there, some one or another who can with any confidence be said to deserve the name of theologian. I know not. Something indeed there was said about

things hidden from the wise and prudent, and revealed unto babes: something also about the relative order of the first and the last. God's verdict is not always as man's; and true inward affinity with the highest truth is often growing on by silent degrees, even, it may be, where, or how, men suspect it least. Meanwhile I can but reply that the very fact of the rarity, if rarity it be, bears, in its own way, witness to the transcendent reality of theological truth.

REASON AND BELIEF IN A PERSONAL GOD.

LET me say, first, that the word "God," if it means anything, must mean, to me, at least this—supreme perfectness of Being. By God, I must mean the highest. I cannot without contradiction conceive at one moment both God and a higher or more comprehensive than God. If, then, I am asked whether I believe in a personal God, the question to me must mean, not whether I imagine, amongst existences, that of one extra, invisible, but indefinitely magnified, shadow of humanity, but whether I am convinced that the supreme sum and crown of all existence is Personal.

Again, a few words as to what Personality means to me. I cannot frame an abstract

definition of it. If I call it self-consciousness, the emphasis is upon the "self." And in fact there is nothing else, except itself, by which we can understand or explain personality. But if I still try to describe what the word suggests to me, I would rather say not so much the presence of intelligence, will, etc., but more eminently the fact of being a centre to which the universe of being appears in relation, a distinct centre of being, a subject, whereof reason, affection, will, consciousness itself, are so many, not separate parts, but several aspects or activities. For the moment I must rest with this.

I.

Now, the fact of intelligent consciousness in man has led on by necessary steps to the postulate of a supreme universal consciousness, whose thought is the world. It is not urged that this follows as demonstrative

knowledge, but as necessary hypothesis—never, indeed, scientifically demonstrable—yet as hypothesis so necessary, so fundamental, that without it all knowledge and thought whatever becomes unrelated, irrational, chaotic. I may explain that I mean to refer to such an argument as that of Mr. Green in his "Prolegomena."

Without another word, I must take this argument, in the main, for granted. But may I remark that the word "consciousness" is apt to be ambiguous; and consciousness is not the ultimate fact in man except when it is tacitly taken as equivalent to self-consciousness, the realization of his own personality? More ultimate in man than the *Cogito* is the *Ego sum* which has been based upon it. Not the fact that he thinks, but the fact that he is that of which thought-capacity is an aspect or corollary, is the primary datum of all knowledge and thought. He thinks, indeed, likes, wills, acts; but that central fact of

which these all are but so many partial aspects is the fact that he is a self.

Now, if the argument is to proceed, as it must, from the basis of our own self-consciousness, it would seem to be more in accordance with the data to use, not only the secondary fact of man's intelligence, but the primary fact of his self-hood, as carrying us on by necessary steps to the postulate, not merely of a supreme universal intelligence, whose thought is the world, but of a supreme Personality, of whose self-existence the thought that constitutes and informs the world is but one aspect or mode.

Here, again, as in the former case, we have rather a necessary hypothesis than demonstrative knowledge. But is not the hypothesis at least a necessary one? If, for the very idea of a kosmos, we must assume one all-informing, omnipresent intelligence, how can we stop short, in our intellectual necessity, of a Person whose intelligence it is? Intelligence

is an inconceivable abstraction—in the very act of mounting the throne of universal sovereignty it dissolves, after all, into voidness without a meaning, except it be an activity or aspect of the being of an intelligent personality.

But if intelligence is really inconceivable apart from an intelligent one, the supposition that an intelligent one can be only intelligent —a living reason without affection, moral character, or whatever else belongs to our necessary conception of a self—this, if not inconceivable, is at least gratuitous. It is an arbitrary imagination, not following out the lines of any data which the world of experience either presents or suggests to us.

Or, to put this differently, it is plain that in our experience of existence there are moral data everywhere, not less obvious, though perhaps more complex, than the rational; and that moral personality is in fact the highest phenomenon to be found in

experience :—not intellect, not will, not even all-sacrificing love—in impersonal abstraction; but these as aspects of personality—personality as that in which these really are, and which itself is in them. Either, then, there is no supreme existence, in which case everything is irrational, and there is really neither knowledge nor universe; or the supreme existence is indefinitely lower than its own lower manifestations ; or the supreme existence is Personal.

Personality, involving, as necessary qualities of its being, reason, will, love, is incomparably the highest phenomenon known to experience, and as such has to be related with whatever is above it and below it by any philosophy based upon experience. But among personalities there are higher and lower. The highest phenomenon, then, known to experience, is moral personality in its most advanced stages of beauty, verging more and more towards its own ideal, growing

with visible approach into the lineaments of perfect goodness.

Either, then, the highest phenomenon known to experience is a more and more glorious approach towards the blankness of an abstraction which is really non-existent—a view which gives the lie not only to every kindling aspiration, but to every essential condition of intellect—or supreme existence is that towards which the most beautiful fulness of human personality is but an approach. But in this case it cannot be lower than personality in its stages of imperfectness. Supreme existence is either inferior to man, with an inferiority which is literally immeasurable, or it is all, at least, which we have known, or can conceive, in Personality. The universe is a chaos void of relations, and man's existence an intolerable enigma and bathos, if the supreme existence does not comprise, as well as transcend, everything in human personality which makes that

personality what it is—the crowning phenomenon of experience, the crowning conception, open to us, of existence.

II.

Now, in all this I have been starting from myself—that is, from human experience of personality; that is, from personality which, at best, is plainly finite, not self-caused, dimly feeling after the conditions of its own existence, conscious of innumerable limitations, most imperfectly realizing itself; so that, when I come to think of it, even when I try to speak simply of my own experience of myself, I am speaking of something which, though suggested by experience, is *not* realized in experience, something which transcends the limitations under which alone I have known it, something to which nothing that I know fully corresponds. This is true, not only of some imaginary absolute, it is true of any idea I can possibly form of the

meaning of the word "personality" as applied to myself. Even this, as I cannot but conceive it, is always more than any momentary, or any collective, experience of mine.

Now, the moment I realize that experience of human personality, though the only knowledge by which we can conceive personality is yet but a dim approach to an idea not attained by it, nor (we may say) attainable, I begin to understand a little better what I am aiming at in arguing for Supreme Personality. It is not that human personality is a realized completeness to which we desire to make our conceptions of Divine Being correspond, but rather that human experience gives us indications of what Personality, in its fuller realization, would mean. Personality that lives only under material conditions in a world of dying, personality whose existence and origin are alike wholly independent of its own thought and will, and which only by degrees discovers a little as to the conditions of its

own being—whatever rank it may hold in relation to other present phenomena—is plainly a most limited and imperfect form of personality. Only, then, Supreme Being can attain the full idea of Personality. The ideals which hover behind and above human experience are suggestions, are approaches more or less, towards that.

III.

And then, by consequence from these thoughts, one step more—namely, that created personalities, which themselves are finite, will only attain their own finite personality perfectly in union with the Infinite Divine.

The relation of the sanctified spirit of man with the Spirit of God that sanctifieth it may be said, perhaps, to involve no difficulty of thought so long as the man is only too sharply differentiated by sin or imperfection. But carry the thought on from all imperfect

stages to the perfection of ultimate Beatitude —no trace left of independency of self-hood, no divergence of thought, feeling, or will— perfect Oneness at last, in the highest conceivable fulness of the words, "He that is joined to the Lord is one spirit;"[1] and what, *then*, exactly, in that supreme unity of spirit, constitutes the distinction between the beatified spirit and its God? Or is perfect beatification, after all, but a Christian form of Nirvana, a merging of separate personality in the life Divine?

I have, indeed, a further object in raising the question. For the difficulty, whatever it be, of conceiving personal distinctness where there is flawless unity of mind and spirit, coupled with the fact that both the distinctness and the unity must be true, if beatification is not to be Nirvana after all, is suggestive also in reference to the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity.

[1] 1 Cor. vi. 17.

I am very far from meaning that the unity of a beatified spirit with God is wholly the same as the unity which binds the Persons of the Blessed Trinity, or that the distinction of Persons in the Blessed Trinity is the same as that which would distinguish a spirit in bliss from its God ; but I do suggest that the intellectual difficulty of conceiving the coincidence of distinctness and unity is so far not dissimilar in the one case and the other, that if you could prove to me that the Athanasian doctrine was irrational, you would by the force of the same proof compel me to choose between eternal separation of spirit from God, or eternal obliteration of myself.

Now, even to raise this question seems to me to help forward our thought. The beatified soul is not God, yet is one with God. What is that, then, which constitutes at once its eternal distinction from, its eternal union with, God ? Perhaps the nearest answer that can be given is—Reciprocation of love.

To the nature of this belongs at once essential unity and essential non-identity—a unity which, but for the personal distinctness, would be but the dead shadow of a living unity, a unity which mere identification would instantly destroy. (I can but glance, in parenthesis, at the scriptural view of the unity of husband and wife, and that mystery of meanings behind, to which the loveliest ideal of marriage unity stands only as shadow of suggestion.)

IV.

But if union with God is necessary for the full personality of created persons, is union with created persons equally necessary for the Personality of Supreme Being?

The question would only be difficult to those who, in their adoration of Divine unity, insist on seeing a merely numerical oneness. For this they are content to strip Supreme Personality of some of the conditions which,

to us at least, make Personality intelligible; perhaps even to shrink from contemplating Supreme Being at all (as Dr. Martineau says that Unitarians commonly do[1]), except in manifested relations to a visible universe, of which, however much it may be informed by Him, this must at least remain eternally true, that He is more than it. But, indeed, the mutual love between God and created beings, even where it has reached its perfectness, though it exhaust the whole possibility of the creature, cannot perfectly fulfil the Being of God.

We seem, then, to ourselves to be uttering only a truism when we say that Supreme Personality must not lack, it must have within itself, as parts of its being, every condition of Supreme Personality. Foremost among such conditions we cannot but conceive that wherein even reason and self-consciousness

[1] Essays, vol. ii.: "A Way out of the Trinitarian Controversy," pp. 527, 533, 534.

find their climax—satisfaction of perfect love. But love that is not mutual is not perfect love.

Without this, then, we must still doubt whether any conception of supreme existence can be, for us, quite real ; whether any true meaning can be put into such words as that God is an Almighty, or Eternal, or Infinite Personality ; whether the conception of the existence from eternity of a single Personality, sole, unrelated, unique—One within whom there is not both active and passive, both subject and object, both contemplating and being contemplated, both loving and being loved—is so much as a consistent possibility ; whether, that is to say, the meaning of eternal existence, as applied to such an one, is, after all, for us, distinguishable from eternal non-existence.

Brevity has compelled me to omit a score of apologies. But, once for all, let me say that I do not dream either that human reason

can, by arguing, prescribe the conditions of Divine existence, or that these things which I have tried to indicate are themselves achievements of reason. Rather it is that in these things, when revealed, reason finds a harmony which she elsewhere had sought in vain.

V.

Does any one say that those who find relatedness, mutual knowledge, mutual love, within the necessity of Supreme Being itself, are, at all events, qualifying, straining, the conception of unity? I submit that they are rather strongly reinforcing it. It might possibly be urged that in eternal reciprocity of Infinite Love, not only is there a real unity, but a unity profounder, more living, truer, *even as unity*, than the loneliness of a merely numerical singularity; at the least, we may venture to doubt whether a conception so external as oneness of mere

number can exhaust the meaning of the unity of the Living God; at the least, we may claim that for us our faith in a Monad is a faith, not with less, but with more richness of meaning, when it images to us, as its inner principle of oneness, not barely the unit of arithmetic, but also the Unity of the Spirit, which is Love.

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